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Since 2013, civil and interstate wars have roiled North Africa and the Middle 
East. These conflicts, along with poverty in both regions, have led to the largest 
migration to Europe since the end of World War II. This thesis considers the effects of 
mass migration on Italy and the European Union (EU). It examines Italian and EU 
military responses to the migrant crisis, as well as possible means to dedicate greater 
resources to aid in security endeavors. This thesis also explores the impacts that the 
migrant crisis has had on the Italian economy and politics. It analyzes the Italian 
immigration system, along with how it interfaces with the EU’s immigration system, and 
explores ways in which both can promote more effective migrant and refugee economic 
integration. This thesis concludes that current EU and Italian efforts to address the 
Mediterranean migrant crisis are falling short of effectively managing the migrant and 
refugee influx. This thesis recommends NATO involvement concerning the security and 
flow management aspects of this challenge, and also argues that better economic 
integration of the migrants and refugees may hold the key to economic renewal in various 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
II. ITALIAN AND EUROPEAN MILITARY RESPONSE TO THE 
MEDITERRANEAN MIGRANT CRISIS ..........................................................9 
A. LIBYA AND NATO INTERVENTION ..................................................9 
B. SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN 
MIGRANT CRISIS .................................................................................12 
C. ITALIAN RESPONSE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN 
MIGRANT CRISIS .................................................................................14 
D. FRONTEX “OPERATION TRITON” AND MORE TRAGEDY ......16 
E. CREATION OF EUNAVFOR MED, ITS MISSION, COSTS, 
AND CHALLENGES ..............................................................................19 
F. THE CASE FOR NATO INVOLVEMENT ..........................................22 
G. HOW CAN NATO HELP EUROPE?....................................................25 
III. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MIGRANT CRISIS ON ITALY ......29 
A. ITALIAN ECONOMY AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE ......29 
B. THE MEDITERRANEAN MIGRANT CRISIS COSTS TO 
ITALY .......................................................................................................33 
C. ITALY’S WAY FORWARD: COMMON SECURITY AND 
DEFENSE POLICY.................................................................................36 
D. ITALY AND THE CSDP ........................................................................38 
E. THE GREATER DEBATE OF EUROPEAN UNION BURDEN 
SHARING .................................................................................................41 
IV. THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE MIGRANT CRISIS ON ITALY .....45 
A. ITALIAN NATIONAL CHARACTER AND POLITICAL 
CHARACTERISTICS .............................................................................45 
B. ASSESSING THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL EFFECTS OF 
THE MIGRATION CRISIS ON ITALY ...............................................49 
C. POPULISM AND EUROSCEPTICISM OF THE FIVE STAR 
MOVEMENT ...........................................................................................51 
D. LEGA NORD: FROM FRINGE PARTY TO POLITICAL 
CONTENDER ..........................................................................................52 
E. DOMESTIC POLITICAL REALITY ALTERS ITALIAN 
FOREIGN POLICY ................................................................................54 
 viii
V.  ITALIAN MIGRATION POLICY AND THE PROSPECTS OF 
REFUGEE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ......................................................59 
A.  THE PROSPECT OF REFUGEES AND ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION .......................................................................................60 
B.  ITALY’S ASYLUM POLICY ................................................................66 
C.  CHALLENGES TO THE ITALIAN ASYLUM SYSTEM ..................69 
D.  THE REALITY OF AND POSSIBILITY FOR MORE 
ECONOMIC GAIN IN ITALY ..............................................................73 
VI.  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................77 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................81 




LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AIS Automatic Identification Services 
ARCI Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale Italiana 
CNDA Commissione nazionale per il diritto di asilo 
CSDP Common Security and Defense Policy 
CTRPI Commissioni territoriali per il riconoscimento della protezione 
internazionale 
EDA European Defense Agency 
EU European Union 
EUNAVFOR Med European Union Naval Forces Mediterranean 
FLIR Forward-Looking Infrared 
FLS Forward Logistics Site 
FRONTEX European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union 
FSM Five Star Movement 
HIP Humanitarian Innovation Project 
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
LN Lega Nord 
MOD Ministry of Defense 
MPA Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
RHIB Rigid-hull Inflatable Boat 
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 
VAT Value-Added Tax 
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution 
 x




It is not often that the realm of the academic is able to effectively merge with 
one’s professional experience. The Naval Postgraduate School is one such institution 
where this notion happens more commonly. As I began my studies at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, global news sources were often occupied by the seemingly never-
ending headlines concerning the Mediterranean migrant crisis. My own operational 
experience mirrors many of the grim events that continue to take place in the 
Mediterranean Sea and sparked my interest in the topic. 
In late September 2010, I was a newly commissioned Ensign assigned to the USS 
Winston S. Churchill homeported in Norfolk, Virginia. I had flown out and met the ship 
in the Indian Ocean a few months prior on my first deployment. While on patrol in the 
Gulf of Aden, the Churchill came across a boat of migrants who were stranded at sea 
while on their way to Yemen from Somalia. Their small skiff, which had tarps rigged 
along the edges to keep water out, had 85 people crammed onto it and no functioning 
motor. The Churchill and her crew were obliged to render assistance to the distressed 
mariners by first attempting to restart their motor. After the ship’s most skilled 
engineman was unable to repair the motor, we hooked the skiff up to one of our rigid hull 
inflatable boats (RHIB) and began towing the skiff back toward the Somali coast where 
its journey started.  
Our efforts to tow the skiff were cautious, as the skiff was not very seaworthy; 
this compelled the operation to proceed at a slow pace. The men, women, and children 
aboard the skiff also lacked the necessary supplies to continue their voyage at sea, which 
necessitated supply runs from our ship. The seas began to slowly build as our RHIB 
continued to tow the skiff. On the morning of September 27, 2010, I walked up to the 
bridge to go on watch and serve as the Conning Officer for the next three hours. As I 
surveyed the ship’s surroundings, I observed some of our crew on a supply run to the 
skiff. As they began to toss over supplies, a few people in the skiff began to rush over to 
the side from which it was being resupplied. The sudden rush of people to one side of the 
barely seaworthy skiff caused the boat to capsize and sent all 85 people into the water.  
 xii
The crew immediately sprang into action. The two RHIBs began to recover 
people from the water, and subsequently placed themselves at risk of capsizing due to 
being swarmed by the desperate migrants. Once the migrants were onboard, the rest of 
the crew began to administer life-saving care. In one case, a young Sailor who served as 
the ship’s barber administered CPR to a migrant and saved his life (her heroic efforts 
merited a call from President Obama a few months later, around Christmas). The rest of 
the crew took to sorting the migrants and arranging their accommodations until we could 
transfer them to a larger vessel with more room and medical capabilities. Despite the 
valiant efforts of the crew of the USS Winston S. Churchill, 13 of the migrants drowned, 
while eight were never recovered. The following few hours while I was on watch, I 
remember sailing around in an effort to recover more survivors, but our efforts were in 
vain. The event encompassed the very best of human nature from the response of the 
crew, but it also displayed the brutal and unforgiving consequences of war, poverty, and 
human smuggling. The crew of the USS Winston S. Churchill encountered a snapshot of 
a growing trend around the world; one that emanates from Africa, Asia, and the Middle 
East, with effects measured on a global scale. This one event during the Churchill’s 2010 
deployment has played out day after day with the Italian Navy and European Union 




To my friends and shipmates from that 2010 deployment on the USS Winston S. 
Churchill: I hope that this study will help policy makers understand the global effect of 
mass migration that we encountered in September 2010. The efforts of many of those 
involved with the rescue mission went largely unnoticed, and I hope this work will honor 
your selfless and brave actions. I would also like to extend warm thanks to David Yost, 
Zachary Shore, and Anne Marie Baylouny for their help and guidance with this thesis. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 2013, due in large part to the wars in Syria and Libya, the largest migration 
of people since World War II has taken place on the European continent.1 Syrian refugees 
have streamed across the border into Turkey and proceeded to Greece by the hundreds of 
thousands, while in Libya, the fall of Muammar Ghadafi and subsequent implosion of the 
Libyan state precipitated the efforts of several hundred thousand refugees and migrants to 
attempt crossing the Mediterranean Sea to Italy. While the routes have been different, 
both migrant and refugee streams have entailed a crossing of the Mediterranean Sea or its 
subsidiary waterways. The world has watched the same repeatedly: overcrowded boats 
filled with desperate people, economic migrants and refugees alike. In their desperation, 
thousands of migrants have perished during their journey across the waters, transforming 
the Mediterranean Sea into a nautical graveyard and its coasts into a waypoint for the 
huddled masses. 
The Mediterranean migrant crisis continues to make headlines around the world. 
Thousands of migrants and refugees attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea on a yearly 
basis, the tide stemming from civil and interstate wars across Northern Africa and the 
Middle East, as well as poor economic conditions throughout Africa that motivate people 
to search for a better life. The dearth of economic opportunity and the preponderance of 
conflict in the aforementioned regions have wide-ranging implications that are no longer 
primarily limited to the country of origin; as mass and nearly uncontrolled migration 
continues into Europe, the political and economic impacts are already emerging.  
Europe finds itself occupied, either directly or indirectly, with challenges 
involving the migrant crisis on a near-daily basis. The European Union’s (EU) Naval 
Forces Mediterranean is the military operation for the humanitarian response and at-sea 
rescue of the migrants, and it is the frontline European military response to the crisis. The 
political aspects of the migrant crisis occupy the European Union after the refugees and 
migrants arrive in Europe. The most recent politically seismic event to strike the 
                                                 
1 Sewell Chan, “How a Record Number of Migrants Made Their Way to Europe,” New York Times, 
December 22, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/23/world/europe/migrant-crisis-europe-million.html.  
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European Union, the June 2016 Brexit referendum, was partially a result of the migrant 
crisis.2 Nearly every terrorist attack in Europe brings fresh and renewed criticism of the 
European Union’s response to the migrant crisis.3 The almost-daily arrival of migrants 
and refugees from neighboring regional conflicts will continue to stoke the fires of the 
immigration debate within Europe, and even with a political solution that quelled the 
continental anxieties today, the refugees and migrants that have already arrived within 
EU borders, over a million in 2015, will be an issue for the foreseeable future.4 
Though the impacts of the migrant crisis are far-reaching and constantly evolving 
across the European continent, detailed analysis through examination of a specific 
country and its response to the crisis may serve as a useful tool for policymakers across 
the European Union. There is perhaps no better case to study in the Mediterranean 
migrant crisis than Italy. As a frontline nation in the crisis, Italy initiated one of the 
largest humanitarian efforts regarding the migrant crisis to date, and did so nearly alone. 
Italy also serves as a major initial entry point into the European Union for refugees and 
migrants, and is second only to Greece in this regard. Italy’s economy is therefore 
disproportionately affected by the migrant crisis compared to most other European Union 
member states, a fact that continues to breed unrest in the native Italian population and is 
a source of political strife. Italy’s attempts to manage the crisis are hindered by its own 
domestic policies concerning asylum and are further compounded by Italy’s agreements 
with the European Union concerning the same issue.  
As Libya experienced conflict that turned into a civil war in 2011, thousands of 
migrants and refugees from across Africa and the Middle East began converging on the 
war-torn country in 2013 to make the perilous journey to Italy. Approximately 60,000 
people reached Europe via the Mediterranean Sea in 2013, and most of them landed in 
                                                 
2 Abi Wilkinson, “The Brexit Vote Is Really About Just One Thing,” New Republic, June 21, 2016, 
https://newrepublic.com/article/134507/brexit-vote-really-just-one-thing.  
3 Tim Lister, “‘One ISIS Attack Every 84 Hours,’ Spurs Dread and Anger in Europe,” CNN, July 31, 
2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/31/europe/isis-attacks-escalating-europe/.  
4 Jonathan Clayton and Hereward Holland, “Over One Million Sea Arrivals Reach Europe in 2015,” 
UNHCR, December 30, 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2015/12/5683d0b56/million-sea-
arrivals-reach-europe-2015.html.  
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Italy.5 Europe found itself thoroughly unprepared for the onslaught of migrants, and Italy 
bore the brunt of the crisis, as its southernmost territory—the island named Lampedusa—
lies only 183 miles from Tripoli, Libya. By September 2013, Lampedusa, with only 6,000 
inhabitants, found itself inundated with over 1,300 migrants.6 Lampedusa had room for 
only 850 migrants in what essentially amounted to a detention camp, and conditions 
became abhorrent.7 Migrants began openly protesting in the streets, which infuriated 
natives and pushed them to a violent response.8 Eventually, officials transferred the 
migrants to prison ships and other Italian facilities.9 
Italy reached a major turning point in its response to the Mediterranean migrant 
crisis when tragedy struck and compelled the government to become proactive in its 
response. In October 2013, over 300 migrants perished off the coast of Lampedusa when 
a boat with 500 migrants capsized.10 This event galvanized public opinion in Italy, and 
the Italian Navy initiated Operation Mare Nostrum within a matter of days of the 
“tragedia di Lampedusa.”11  
Mare Nostrum was a well-equipped and robust crisis-response operation that 
saved upwards of 150,000 migrants.12 At a cost of €9 million per month of operation, the 
Italian Navy not only rescued migrants, but also seized human traffickers’ motherships 
and captured 330 alleged human traffickers.13 Despite the success of Mare Nostrum, the 
                                                 
5 “Mapping Mediterranean Migration,” BBC, September 15, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-24521614. 
6 Jeffrey Tayler, “Amid Record Waves of Refugees, Italy Finding Limits to Its Compassion,” National 





10 Adam Taylor, “Italy Ran an Operation that Saved Thousands of Migrants from Drowning in the 
Mediterranean. Why Did It Stop?” Washington Post, April 20, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/04/20/italy-ran-an-operation-that-save-
thousands-of-migrants-from-drowning-in-the-mediterranean-why-did-it-stop/. 
11 Tayler, “Amid Record Waves of Refugees.”  




Italian government stopped the operation in October 2014.14 The Italian Interior Minister, 
Angelino Alfano, stated in announcing the operation’s conclusion that “Mare Nostrum is 
closing down because it was an emergency operation.”15 However, the emergency was 
far from winding down.  
The costs of mounting the successful, although expensive, humanitarian response 
Operation Mare Nostrum represent but a fraction of the overall Italian costs of the crisis. 
Since 2011, Italy has allocated €2.9 billion in crisis-response funds, which include 
migrant shelters, health care, counseling, clothing, language training, and vocational 
training.16 The entire process takes from 12 to 18 months until migrants granted asylum 
can enter the Italian workforce.17 With a deficit accounting for 130% of GDP, Italy can 
hardly spare the finances to provide for the migrants without adding more to its debt.18 
The European Union mandates that all members limit their annual deficits to 3%, with 
member states going above that percentage having to pay penalties.19 In its 2016 budget 
presented to the European Commission, Italy requested a 0.2% waiver on its target deficit 
allowance, which equates to roughly €3 billion.20 This amount is nearly identical to the 
sum that Italy has spent thus far in response to the migrant crisis.  
Italy continues to struggle to provide shelter to the thousands of migrants arriving 
on its shores. In August 2015, the government announced a plan to convert former 
prisons into lodgings in order to accommodate 20,000 migrants.21 Migrant centers have 
                                                 
14 Taylor, “Italy Ran an Operation that Saved Thousands of Migrants.” 
15 Ibid. 
16 Liam Moloney, “Booming Migrant Business in Italy Comes Under Scrutiny,” Wall Street Journal, 
April 24, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/booming-migrant-business-in-italy-comes-under-scrutiny-
1429848102.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Tony Barber, “Italy’s Finance Minister Defends Rome Against Budget Criticism,” Financial Times, 




21 Umberto Bacchi, “EU Migrant Crisis: Italy Prepares Ex-prisons to Accommodate 20,000 New 
Arrivals,” International Business Times, August 27, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/eu-migrant-crisis-
italy-prepares-ex-prisons-accommodate-20000-new-arrivals-1517368. 
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sprouted up in many cities in southern Italy, as the Italian government has increased its 
financial assistance to the migrants. The Italian Interior Ministry pays the migrant centers 
approximately €35 per adult and €80 per child hosted on a daily basis, and gives the 
migrants another €2 to €2.5 daily allowance.22 This rather generous daily allowance per 
migrant has caught the eye of the Italian mafia. Widespread arrests of purported mafia 
members took place in June 2015, due to their connections with setting up migrant 
centers.23 Italian experts contend that the mafia is exploiting ties with other international 
criminal organizations to arrange smuggling of migrants into Italy in order to take 
advantage of welfare benefits provided by the Italian government, further complicating 
the burgeoning economic problems caused by the migrant crisis.24  
Political responses by Italy concerning the migrant crisis must be examined 
through two lenses: the domestic and international responses. Domestically, the migrant 
crisis has strained the economic resources of Italy; this has led to the electoral rise of the 
Lega Nord, or the Northern League. The Northern League is a right-wing party that is 
profoundly anti-immigrant.25 The party’s leader, Matteo Salvini, criticizes the Italian 
government for providing too many benefits to migrants, and he has publicly advocated 
that Italian citizens claim asylum in order to cash in on the benefits provided to the 
migrants in Italy.26 Salvini’s vitriolic rhetoric reflects a growing unrest throughout the 
country. In July 2015, protests erupted outside of Rome in the suburb of Casale San 
Nicola against the migrant presence in the area.27 Fourteen police officers were injured, 
                                                 
22 Moloney, “Booming Migrant Business,” Wall Street Journal.  
23 “Italy Arrests 44 in Migrant Centre Probe,” BBC, June 4, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-33009027. 
24 Ludovica Iocinno, “Mediterranean Migrant Crisis: Human Smuggling Arranged ‘By Global Mafia 
Via Skype and WhatsApp,’” International Business Times, April 24, 2015, 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/mediterranean-migrant-crisis-human-smuggling-arranged-by-global-mafia-via-
skype-whatsapp-1498209. 
25 Stephanie Kirchgaessner, “Rightwing Northern League Makes Gains in Italian Elections,” 
Guardian, June 1, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/01/northern-league-gains-italian-
elections-matteo-salvini. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Nick Squires, “Violent Clashes Break Out in Rome as Italian Opposition to Migrants Increases,” 
Telegraph, July 17, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/11747106/Violent-
clashes-break-out-in-Rome-as-Italian-opposition-to-migrants-increases.html.  
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and the 19 migrants located in the town were escorted out under police protection.28 
Similar protests and demonstrations have occurred throughout Italy since 2013, spurred 
by “openly neo-fascist” political parties like CasaPound and Forza Nuova.29  
While the Italian government must contend with a tumultuous domestic political 
situation, it must also deal with the European Union on the international level. The 
European Union’s responses to the migrant crisis continue to evolve, and rifts within the 
union have emerged. In June 2015, a frustrated Italian government floated the possibility, 
perhaps as a veiled threat, that unless the European Union defined an arrangement to 
share the costs of migration, Italy would issue visas to migrants to allow them to travel 
throughout the Schengen zone to wealthier EU member states.30 Italian prime Minister 
Matteo Renzi also threatened to not allow docking of ships that rescued migrants, forcing 
them to other EU member state ports.31 In October 2015, the rifts appeared to grow wider 
as Renzi criticized EU Council President Donald Tusk’s comments on the Italian 
response to the migrant crisis.32  
The EU has been slow to adequately respond to the migrant crisis. In September 
2015, the EU agreed to a plan to redistribute 160,000 migrants from Italy and Greece to 
the rest of the union’s member states over a two-year period.33 As of March 2016, only 
660 refugees were relocated from Greece and Italy to other EU nations under this 
program.34 The program’s progress thus far has been slow-moving, but even more 
                                                 
28 Ibid.  
29 Carol Massimo, “Immigrant Surge Bring Out Italy’s Dark Side,” Newsweek, October 19, 2015, 
http://www.newsweek.com/immigrant-surge-brings-out-italys-dark-side-384925.  
30 Ian Traynor, “Italy Threatens to Give Schengen Visas to Migrants as EU Ministers Meet,” 
Guardian, June 16, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/15/italy-threatens-to-give-
schengen-visas-to-migrants-as-eu-dispute-deepens.  
31 Ibid.  
32 “Don’t Run Down Italy’s Refugee Effort, Angry Renzi Tells EU Boss,” Reuters, October 16, 2015, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/16/europe-migrants-renzi-
idUSL8N12G01120151016#xgTaphp8uqX5PM22.97.  
33 Giada Zampano, Anna Molin, and Valentina Pop, “EU Migrant Distribution Plan Kicks Off as Italy 
Flies 19 Eritreans to Sweden,” Wall Street Journal, October 9, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/italy-
flies-19-eritrean-migrants-to-resettle-in-sweden-1444385837. 
34 Jon Henley, “EU Refugee Relocation Scheme Is Inadequate and Will Continue to Fail,” Guardian, 
March 4, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/04/eu-refugee-relocation-scheme-
inadequate-will-continue-to-fail.  
 7
migrants and refugees are expected to arrive in the coming years. This is a source of 
political contention not only between Italy and the EU, but also between the EU and 
many other migrant crisis frontline nations. This crisis threatens the viability of free 
movement in the European Union’s Schengen zone unless a political solution can be 
agreed upon in the near future.35 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II presents an introduction to the 
Mediterranean migrant crisis through an examination of Italy’s humanitarian response, 
Operation Mare Nostrum, and its EU successor mission, Operation Sophia. Chapter II 
also outlines additional measures for crisis management, including the possible 
involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  
Chapter III examines the costs of the Italian response to the crisis within the larger 
context of the Italian economy. This chapter underscores the need for greater European 
Union integration and defense burden sharing as a potential remedy to the current 
migrant crisis, as well as foreseeable security and economic crises to come. Chapter IV 
considers how the migrant crisis has affected Italian politics. 
Chapter V investigates the prospect of refugee economic integration and assesses 
efforts to promote such integration by the Italian government. This chapter highlights the 
problems of the Italian immigration system, as well as Italy’s interactions with the 
European Union on immigration matters. This chapter makes a case for greater economic 
integration of migrants and refugees in Italy, and reviews possible policy proposals to 
alleviate some of the problems that Italy has encountered in its relationship with the 
European Union regarding immigration matters. Chapter VI offers conclusions. 
  
                                                 
35 Matthew Holehouse, “Migrant Crisis: European Council President Tusk Warns Schengen on Brink 
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II. ITALIAN AND EUROPEAN MILITARY RESPONSE TO THE 
MEDITERRANEAN MIGRANT CRISIS  
Between January and July 2016, 2,505 migrants drowned in the Mediterranean 
Sea.36 Since the beginning of 2016, nearly 80,000 migrants have arrived in Europe via 
the Mediterranean Sea.37 Both figures roughly follow the numbers of the previous year. 
The European Union’s response to this crisis continues to evolve, and no unified political 
solution is likely in the near future. The burgeoning crisis and resulting grim deaths raise 
the following questions: What factors facilitate migration to Italy via the Mediterranean? 
How has Italy responded to the simultaneous border security and humanitarian crisis? 
What has the European Union’s response been thus far to the Mediterranean Crisis? 
Examination of the causal factors of migration and the resulting frenzied European Union 
response is a necessary step to formulate more effective policies that better handle the 
crisis and hold the possibility of saving more lives.  
A. LIBYA AND NATO INTERVENTION 
Since 80% of Italy-bound migrants who crossed the Mediterranean in 2015 
departed from Libyan shores, it is necessary to examine what factors make Libya a 
popular point of departure for those brave enough to make the journey.38 Libya, in its 
current form, constitutes a failed state. The recognized Libyan government does not, and 
cannot, maintain a monopoly on the use of force within Libya’s borders. In September 
2015, the U.S. State Department issued a warning to all U.S. citizens in Libya, advising 
them to leave immediately due to the risk of terrorist attacks against U.S. interests, which 
the Libyan government cannot prevent, because “various militias have supplanted the 
                                                 
36 “International Organization for Migration,” International Organization for Migration, Last modified 
July 15, 2016, http://www.iom.int/. 
37 Ibid.  
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police in maintaining internal security.”39 In August 2015, Italian Foreign Minister Paolo 
Gentiloni stated that if the then-pending Libyan peace talks did not succeed, then “we 
will find ourselves with another Somalia two steps from our coasts.”40 Without an 
effective army or police force, Libya cannot govern its territory, much less stop or inhibit 
irregular mass migration from its shores. 
How did the situation in Libya come to this point? To answer this question, one 
must look back to when the state lost the monopoly of the use of force. By no means a 
benevolent dictator, Muammar Ghadafi maintained control over Libya through the 
support of various militias and committees that he supplied with money and weapons.41 
While propping up the various militias, Ghadafi decidedly neglected his army and left his 
country bereft of a capable and functioning bureaucracy.42 Ghadafi held power because he 
negated the likelihood of any credible threat to his rule by keeping the state and its 
security apparatus fragmented and impotent. Libya found itself, like many Arab countries 
of the time, caught up in the Arab Spring in February 2011.43 The Ghadafi regime 
proceeded to incur battles with various rebel groups, and reports of the conflict, though 
later proven to be false, declared that Ghadafi went on a rampage and slaughtered 
civilians by the thousands.44 These reports precipitated NATO action in March 2011.45 
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In accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973, 
NATO took control of international forces and began Operation Unified Protector on 
March 31, 2011.46 UNSCR 1973 granted NATO the ability to “take all necessary 
measures . . . to protect civilians” in Libya.47 An initial NATO arms embargo and no-fly 
zone in Libya evolved to include “over 9,000 strike sorties” that destroyed “over 5,900 
military targets.”48 After months of continued strikes by participating NATO allies and 
partners, rebel forces removed Ghadafi’s hold on power in August 2011.49 Compared to 
other major NATO operations, Operation Unified Protector was inexpensive and short.50 
The NATO-led operation did not entail the use of ground forces, as this contingency was 
outside of the scope of UNSCR 1973.51 Then-NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen offered Libya the prospect of technical assistance in the form of “defense and 
security sector reform.”52 Marking the formal end of Operation Unified Protector on 
October 31, 2011, Rasmussen made an historic visit to Libya to tout NATO success. In a 
press conference with the leader of the National Transitional Council, Mustafa Abdul 
Jalil, Rasmussen congratulated the Libyan people on their hard-won freedom, and praised 
their efforts to begin building “a new Libya, based on freedom, democracy, human rights, 
the rule of law and reconciliation.”53 Sadly, the aftermath of NATO’s intervention in 
Libya could not be further from Rasmussen’s hopeful vision. 
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B. SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN MIGRANT 
CRISIS 
In December 2012, Russian president Vladimir Putin assessed the situation in 
Libya by stating that “the state is falling apart. . . . Interethnic, interclan, and intertribal 
conflicts continue.”54 Today, Libya sees its oil-rich eastern region claiming autonomy, 
two different factions claiming the right of governance, the rise of ISIS and other Islamist 
militias, and four prime ministers in the course of the last four years.55 Reprisal killings 
by rebels began directly after Ghadafi’s exit from power, and have increased in number 
every year since Ghadafi’s demise.56 The United Nations estimates that approximately 
400,000 Libyans have fled their homes since 2011, while oil production is but a fraction 
of what it was before the NATO intervention.57 Kidnappings are on the rise, and various 
militias continue to fight each other, and kill civilians in the process.58 The United 
Nations called for a ceasefire in August 2015, in an attempt to negotiate a peaceful 
agreement between warring factions.59 As of July 2016, Libya still faces the reality of a 
divided and incapable government, in spite of UN efforts and widespread international 
recognition of the Government of National Accord.60 Continued disagreements between 
the internationally recognized government and the unofficial government suggest that the 
near-term prospects for peace are remote.61 Libya’s new problems add to those of an 
already troubled region. 
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Libya borders many countries rated as “not free” by Freedom House, including 
Algeria, Chad, and Egypt.62 Sudan, one of the most oppressive states in the world, shares 
Libya’s southeast border.63 Eritrea borders Sudan, which constitutes another of the 
world’s most repressive regimes, and the failed state of Somalia lies further east.64 The 
Syrian Civil War continues to disperse hundreds of thousands of Syrians across the 
world, including Egypt, which shares Libya’s eastern border.65 Many people from these 
countries entered Libya while Ghadafi held power, in hopes of reaching Europe via the 
Mediterranean Sea.66 According to Freedom House’s 2011 Report on Libya: 
Human rights organizations have documented and criticized the country’s 
treatment of these migrants, including forced repatriation of detainees to 
countries where they are at high risk of torture and mistreatment by their 
home governments. Following a 2009 agreement between Libya and Italy 
on joint naval operations to stop illegal migration, there have been reports 
of Libyan authorities firing live ammunition at boats they believe to be 
carrying illegal migrants.67 
In 2010, the European Union entered into agreement with Ghadafi to provide €60 
million over three years to “assist” Libya in its efforts to modernize its immigration 
infrastructure, an agreement that seems to have been calculated to encourage Libyan 
authorities to limit migration to Europe.68 Critics of this agreement asserted that the 
European Union was outsourcing its responsibilities concerning global asylum-seekers, 
and effective migrant relocation, to a country with a terrible human rights record.69 The 
NATO-aided removal of Ghadafi from power, the ensuing failure of the successor Libyan 
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government, and the added factor of despotic and repressive governments in the region 
culminated in Libya becoming the gateway to Europe for hundreds of thousands of 
people seeking a better life. The conditions all led to the Mediterranean migrant crisis. 
C. ITALIAN RESPONSE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN MIGRANT CRISIS 
As Libya experienced conflict that turned into a civil war, thousands of migrants 
from across Africa and the Middle East began converging on the war-torn country in 
2013 to make the perilous journey to Italy. Approximately 60,000 people reached Europe 
via the Mediterranean Sea in 2013, and most of them landed in Italy.70 Europe found 
itself thoroughly unprepared for the onslaught of migrants, and Italy bore the brunt of the 
crisis, as its southernmost territory of Lampedusa lies only 183 miles from Tripoli, Libya. 
By September 2013, Lampedusa, an island with only 6,000 inhabitants, found itself 
inundated with over 1,300 migrants.71 Lampedusa had room for only 850 migrants in 
what essentially amounted to a detention camp, and conditions became abhorrent.72 
Migrants began openly protesting in the streets, which infuriated natives and pushed them 
to a violent response.73 Eventually, officials transferred the migrants to prison ships and 
other Italian facilities.74 
Italy reached a major turning point in its response to the Mediterranean migrant 
crisis when tragedy struck and compelled the government to become proactive in its 
response. In October 2013, over 300 migrants perished off the coast of Lampedusa when 
a boat of 500 migrants capsized.75 This event galvanized public opinion in Italy, and the 
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Italian Navy initiated Operation Mare Nostrum within a matter of days of the “tragedia 
di Lampedusa.”76  
Mare Nostrum was a well-equipped and robust crisis-response operation that 
saved upwards of 150,000 migrants.77 At a cost of €9 million per month of operation, the 
Italian Navy not only rescued migrants, but seized human traffickers’ motherships, and 
captured 330 alleged human traffickers.78 The force composition of Mare Nostrum is an 
important element to examine for possible future missions. It constituted the following 
elements: 
 One amphibious vessel with specific command and control features, [plus] 
medical and shelter facilities for the would-be migrants; 
 One [or] two frigates and two second line high seas units—either 
patrollers or corvettes—with wide range and medical care capabilities; 
 Helicopters onboard (to be readily deployed to Lampedusa or Catania); 
 A SAN MARCO Marine Brigade team in charge of vessel inspections and 
the safety of migrants onboard; 
 A Coastal radar network and Italian Navy AIS (Automatic Identification 
System) shore stations; 
 One ATLANTIC 1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) based in Sigonella for 
maritime patrol; 
 One Air Force PREDATOR A+ based in Sigonella for maritime patrol; 
 One MM P180 aircraft equipped with Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR), 
based in Catania; 
 Two Camcopter S-100 unmanned aerial vehicles onboard ITS [Italian 
Ship] San Giusto; 
 One Forward Logistic Site (FLS) in Lampedusa for logistics support to the 
units deployed to Mare Nostrum.79 
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Despite the success of Mare Nostrum, the Italian government stopped the 
operation in October 2014.80 The Italian Interior Minister, Angelina Alfano, stated during 
the announcement of the operation’s conclusion that “Mare Nostrum is closing down 
because it was an emergency operation.” However, the emergency was far from winding 
down.81 The real reason that Rome shut down Mare Nostrum probably revolved around 
the fact that Italy paid for the operation almost entirely by itself. The EU contribution to 
Mare Nostrum totaled a paltry sum of €1.8 million, which constituted only 2% of the 
overall cost of the operation.82 A second reason that the operation shut down was 
probably the perception that by operating successful search-and-rescue missions, Italy 
encouraged more migrants to make the journey.83 The British Foreign Office made this 
case when Lady Anelay announced that “we do not support planned search and rescue 
operations in the Mediterranean,” reasoning that rescue missions were “an unintended 
‘pull factor’, encouraging more migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing and 
thereby leading to more tragic and unnecessary deaths.”84 History would be quick to 
disprove this notion. 
D. FRONTEX “OPERATION TRITON” AND MORE TRAGEDY 
The ending of Mare Nostrum compelled EU action, though the resulting mission 
rollout revealed a disjointed effort. In late September 2014, as the shutdown of Mare 
Nostrum became evident, EU officials met with Italian authorities to formulate a 
successor mission to the highly successful Mare Nostrum.85 The official announcement 
of a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
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Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) mission accompanied 
an ambiguous closing statement.86 The statement concluded that “while saving lives is an 
absolute priority in in all maritime operations coordinated by FRONTEX, the focus of 
Joint Operation Triton will be primarily border management.”87 Operation Triton 
appeared to have more limited objectives than had Mare Nostrum. 
Operation Triton officially began on November 1, 2014. The budget and force 
composition made it clear that it would be nowhere near the scope of Mare Nostrum, with 
a monthly budget of only €2.9 million, compared to Mare Nostrum’s €12 million 
monthly operating budget.88 A smaller budget dictated fewer available assets, as the 
FRONTEX operation requested “two fixed-wing surveillance aircraft [and] three patrol 
vessels, as well as seven teams of guest officers for debriefing/intelligence gathering and 
screening/identification purposes.”89 The operation was intended to supplement Italian 
efforts after Mare Nostrum, with the EU explicitly stating that Italy would need to 
continue its own national efforts to manage the crisis.90 The Italian Navy made clear that 
it would respond to distress calls, but it was also clear that the days of 24-hour response 
from readily available assets would dwindle.91 With a reduced budget and asset 
availability, Operation Triton’s Area of Responsibility would pale in comparison to Mare 
Nostrum. The Italian operation included going up to the edge of Libyan national waters, 
while Operation Triton would go no further than 30 nautical miles off the Italian coast.92  
Speculation about the success of Operation Triton started before the operation 
began. Enrique Naegali of Foreign Affairs Review contended that as conflict in North 
Africa and the Middle East intensified, even more migrants would make the trip across 
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the Mediterranean, and predicted that this would either exhaust Operation Triton’s budget 
or cause a greater humanitarian crisis.93 UN Migration Envoy representative Peter 
Sutherland expressed doubts about the range of the operation, saying that it could lead to 
greater loss of life.94 Judith Sunderland of Human Rights Watch contended that “the 
limited range and border enforcement mandate of Operation Triton are no substitute for 
Mare Nostrum,” further adding that “if the EU is serious about preventing future 
tragedies, it needs to give Triton the mandate and resources to rescue boats throughout 
the Mediterranean.”95 More pointed criticism came from Fillipo Miraglia of the 
Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale Italiana (ARCI), an Italian activist group that aids 
migrants: “Triton won’t stop the arrival of migrants, nor will it avoid their slaughter out 
at sea.”96 All of this speculation and criticism occurred as the migration season wound 
down in the Mediterranean during the winter; the effectiveness of Operation Triton would 
not be tested until the migration season began again in March 2015.97  
The beginning of the migration season in early 2015 saw deaths in the 
Mediterranean Sea increase by tenfold compared to the same period of observation in 
2014.98 Worse weather and the greater overcrowding of boats by human traffickers sent 
more people to their deaths.99 On April 19, 2015, with the migration season well 
underway, a boat suspected of carrying well over 700 migrants capsized, and the Italian 
coast guard recovered only 28 migrants from the disaster.100 Operation Triton, coupled 
with reduced Italian naval presence, confirmed that the fears expressed by many human 
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rights activists were well-founded. The suspension of the suspected “pull” factor of safe 
transit provided by the Italian Navy, which ceased before the 2015 migration season, did 
not inhibit more migrants from making the journey across the Mediterranean. The April 
19, 2015, tragedy, along with mounting international criticism, would lead to an even 
greater European Union response, spearheaded by Italy. 
E. CREATION OF EUNAVFOR MED, ITS MISSION, COSTS, AND 
CHALLENGES 
One day after the drowning of over 700 migrants in the Mediterranean, the 
European Council expressed “a strong commitment to act in order to prevent human 
tragedies resulting from the smuggling of people across the Mediterranean.”101 Three 
days later, the European Council committed to increasing the presence of the European 
Union in the Mediterranean, with the highest priority given to preventing more migrants 
from perishing at sea.102 On May 18, 2015, the European Council officially created 
European Union Naval Forces Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med), charged with the 
mission of disrupting the business model of smugglers and human traffickers.103 
EUNAVFOR Med’s mission would transpire over three phases: the first phase entailed 
the gathering of intelligence about human trafficking networks; the second phase, 
currently underway, involves boarding, seizing, or diverting suspected trafficking vessels; 
and the third phase will entail destroying or disabling suspected vessels used by human 
traffickers.104 The forces under operational control of EUNAVFOR Med will continue to 
respond to distress calls, in addition to meeting the aforementioned mission objectives. 
The last phase will require either a UN Security Council Resolution, or consent by the 
vessel’s parent nation to board or destroy a suspected vessel.105 The original mandate for 
EUNAVFOR Med was one year after commencement of the operation, and the mission 
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was re-named Operation Sophia.106 Just a month before the operation reached its expiry 
date, on June 20, 2016, the European Council announced that it would extend Operation’s 
Sophia’s mandate by one year until the end of July 2017.107  
In contrast with FRONTEX Operation Triton, Operation Sophia boasts robust 
participation from EU Member States, including the Czech Republic, France, Italy, 
Germany, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom, and nominal contributions by other 
member states.108 Financially, the common costs for the start-up and one year mandate 
are €11.82 million, with additional contributions made by participating member states.109 
The force composition of Operation Sophia is also much more robust than that of 
Operation Triton, as it includes the employment of one aircraft carrier, eight surface and 
sub-surface units, and twelve aircraft.110 Phase one of Operation Sophia formally 
commenced on June 22, 2015.111  
Operation Sophia faces many obstacles to its success, which are both inherent to 
the mission and external. First, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon 
expressed doubt over the dual objectives of the mission, specifically saving migrants 
while firing on vessels used by human traffickers.112 Ban Ki-Moon’s concern is primarily 
for the safety of the migrants caught in the potential crossfire from EU Naval Forces and 
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human traffickers.113 A second concern is the political feasibility of moving to the third 
phase of operations, which would require a UN Security Council Resolution or an 
invitation by the Libyan government.114 A unified Libyan government is essentially non-
existent, and contending factions are currently attempting to negotiate a unified 
government.115 Efforts to gain approval for a UN Security Council Resolution to 
authorize the use of force against human traffickers face opposition from Russia and 
China.116 A third challenge to the success of the Operation Sophia mission is the ability 
to distinguish between smuggling vessels and commercial or fishing vessels.117 The 
vessels used by the human traffickers are remarkably varied; to ensure that there are no 
inadvertent migrant casualties, EU Naval Forces would have to evacuate the vessels 
completely before scuttling them. The fourth concern is that the mission does not address 
the causal factors underlying the Mediterranean migrant crisis, which include an unstable 
North Africa and Middle East.118  
When the European Council extended the mandate of Operation Sophia in June 
2016, it also expanded the scope of the operation. In addition to the initial three phases, 
the Council added two new tasks: to train a new Libyan coastguard and to interdict arms 
shipments to the war-torn country.119 Since Libya does not have a functioning 
government, it also lacks the capacity to conduct maritime search-and-rescue operations. 
The new task of training a Libyan coastguard will likely meet failure if a political 
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solution is not reached to unify the government. Until then, government funding and 
control of functional law-enforcement elements, to include the coast guard, will remain 
dubious. The additional task of the interdiction of arms shipments is necessary due to the 
rise of the Libyan branch of the Islamic State of the Iraq and Levant (ISIL), but the 
operation’s new scope will likely necessitate an expansion of operational resources and 
the budget.120  
Italian Admiral Enrico Credendino, who serves as the commander of Operation 
Sophia, acknowledged the causal factors of the crisis in a recent interview, stating that 
“by itself, without a global approach, the military operation cannot work. We will only be 
effective if, at the same time, the causes of the departures are combated, if these people 
[migrants] are helped to find a better life.”121 The operation has thus far succeeded in 
rescuing close to 16,000 migrants who might have otherwise perished.122 Though more 
robust in size, resources, and mission than Operation Triton, Operation Sophia faces 
many political and operational challenges that stand in the way of its success. As the 
Mediterranean Sea’s migrant death toll for 2016 is on pace to match, or possibly exceed 
the numbers of 2015, it is unclear how the European Council measures the success of the 
operation, though it is clear that the EU Naval Force’s presence is keeping the number of 
deaths lower than what it might be without the EU naval presence. Italy will continue to 
lead the mission, as it has the greatest stake in its success, though it is likely that, despite 
the new and concerted effort by the EU, more resources will be required to end the 
newfound function of the Mediterranean Sea that serves today as a nautical graveyard.  
F. THE CASE FOR NATO INVOLVEMENT 
The contributions that NATO made to the underlying causes of the Mediterranean 
crisis are substantial and undeniable. Its assistance in the removal of Ghadafi, according to 
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David S. Yost, “has implicated it in Libya’s future.”123 Expansion of this argument 
includes the resulting Mediterranean migrant crisis, caused in large part by the failure and 
incapacity of the Libyan state to effectively govern. By intervening, NATO could help to 
prevent the possible security crisis that will unfold in Europe in the coming years due in 
part to the threat of terrorism, and the Alliance could bolster its international credibility in 
the aftermath of the failure of the Libyan state. Since the European Council left open the 
possibility of third state involvement in the EUNAVFOR Med mission, NATO can and 
should assist with the mission through various military and political means. 
As noted earlier, one reason for NATO involvement is the security threat that 
terrorism poses to NATO member states and NATO partners. NATO Secretary General 
Jens Stoltenberg identified some of those potential threats when he stated:  
to the South, we meet and we are faced with non-state threats and 
challenges. And that’s a much more mixed and complicated picture. We 
see violence, turmoil in Iraq, Syria and North Africa. We see people trying 
to cross the Mediterranean. And we also see terrorist attacks taking place 
in our streets inspired by some ISIL and other terrorist organizations in the 
South.124 
General Philip Breedlove, the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR), echoed Stoltenberg’s sentiments when he expressed concern about the 
possibility of extremists hiding in the mix of legitimate migrants and refugees, and 
crossing the Mediterranean to gain access to Europe.125 Breedlove’s warnings were 
vindicated in November 2015, when a coordinated terrorist attack took place in Paris, 
France. Of the nine perpetrators killed in the attacks, at least one, M. al-Mahmod, entered 
the European Union through Greece by posing as a Syrian refugee.126 In February 2016, 
German police officials thwarted a possible terrorist attack by an Algerian couple posing 
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as Syrian refugees.127 While the vast majority of refugees are fleeing war and oppression 
and most economic migrants are simply seeking a better life, the European Union’s 
ability to control the flow of people into Europe is nearly non-existent.  
A second reason why NATO should intervene in the migrant crisis is to salvage 
its international credibility following its intervention in Libya. As the migrant crisis in the 
Mediterranean and elsewhere worsens, the chorus of criticism blaming NATO and some 
of its member states for the current conditions in Libya continues to echo around the 
world. Criticism spans from traditional anti-Western foes like Russia to NATO member 
states. Russia overtly blames the West for the current chaos in Libya.128 Vladimir Putin 
carries this narrative over to the migrant crisis, stating that it is yet another terrible 
outcome due to Western “‘incorrect’ foreign policy.”129 The Russian regime goes so far 
as to say that Europe could learn from Russia about how to handle migrants, as it took 
several thousand Ukrainians in from the current unrest in eastern Ukraine.130 Czech 
president Milos Zeman has echoed Russian criticism by asserting that the migrant crisis 
stems from western meddling in the Middle East and Africa.131 The South African 
president, Jacob Zuma, recently and pointedly blamed Europe and NATO for the ongoing 
migrant crisis by flatly stating, “they [the NATO Allies] caused it. They must address 
it.”132 While Austria is not a NATO member, the leader of its far-right party, Heinz-
Christian Strache, after blaming NATO for the current crisis, sharply proclaimed that “the 
USA for decades has started fires in the Middle East and then has the chutzpah to claim 
that responsibility for the flood of refugees unleashed lies with Europe. That’s 
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geostrategic detribalization at its finest.”133 After the body of a two-year-old Syrian boy 
washed up on Turkish shores in early September 2015 and made international headlines, 
Turkish president Recep Erdogan said without hesitation, “to be honest, the whole 
Western world is to be blamed, in my opinion, on this issue.”134 As the photos of dead 
migrants continue to make international headlines, NATO must consider its role in the 
current crisis, as well as its future role as an internationally credible military organization. 
The NATO brand has definitely been tarnished by Libya’s post-Ghadafi condition and 
the Mediterranean migrant crisis, and it is in thorough need of re-branding. In response to 
an interviewer’s question as to the “worst mistake” of his presidency, President Obama 
said that it was “probably failing to plan for the day after, what I think was the right thing 
to do, in intervening in Libya.”135 By the president’s own admission, Libya is now a 
“mess.”136  
G. HOW CAN NATO HELP EUROPE? 
European Council Decision 2015/778, which launched EUNAVFOR Med, stated 
that:  
Without prejudice to the [European] Union’s decision-making autonomy 
or to the single institutional framework, and in accordance with the 
relevant guidelines of the European Council, third States may be invited to 
participate in the operation... Third States making significant military 
contributions to EUNAVFOR MED shall have the same rights and 
obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the operation as 
Member States taking part in the operation.137 
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Under these auspices, NATO member-states could assist the European Union in 
its current mission. If the logistics or political feasibility of this option were not 
sustainable, then a second option through which NATO could assist in the migrant crisis 
is through the expansion of Operation Sea Guardian.138 This operation is a renaming of 
the original Operation Active Endeavor, which started as an Article 5 operation in the 
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and evolved into Operation Sea 
Guardian, which continues to serve as a detection and disruption operation against 
terrorism in the Mediterranean, among other mission capabilities.139  
Due to the threat of terrorism posed by the migrant influx, NATO resources could 
be brought to bear to aid Europe by ramping up Operation Sea Guardian. This would 
assist the EU through the employment of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
air assets, and could also provide more naval assets to aid with search and rescue 
requirements in the interim. This would not necessarily be limited to NATO member 
states, but could be extended to the NATO partners that assisted with Operation Unified 
Protector and other NATO partners. These actions could serve as quick ways for NATO 
to increase support and provide additional resources for Operation Sophia. Such military 
aid should be accompanied by European Union efforts to effectively screen and 
document all the people rescued from the Mediterranean Sea. This would, at a minimum, 
entail the building of a vast array of refugee/migrant identification centers and shelters, 
which would be located in European Union member states or partner nations. In addition 
to serving as an operation of humanitarian assistance as well as migratory control, the 
mission could also serve as a means of addressing European domestic political concerns. 
The fear pervades many Europeans that the EU has little control over the migrant crisis, 
which is essentially true. Such an expansion of NATO activities in the Mediterranean Sea 
could assuage rising unease among much of the European public, an advantage explored 
in Chapter IV.  
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Recognizing the possibility of assistance to the European Union, NATO is 
beginning to lay the foundation for possible aid to Operation Sophia. In the July 2016 
Warsaw Communiqué, NATO leaders stated that:  
We have agreed, in principle, on a possible NATO role in the Central 
Mediterranean, to complement and/or, upon European Union request, 
support, as appropriate, the EU’s Operation Sophia through the provision 
of a range of capabilities including Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance, and logistics support; through contribution to capacity 
building of the Libyan coastguard and navy, if requested by the legitimate 
Libyan authorities and/or the EU; and in the context of the implementation 
of UNSCR 2292 on the situation in Libya, in close coordination with the 
EU.140 
NATO needs to sharpen its focus when looking to the future. Libya will need vast 
amounts of help as far as institution building is concerned, and NATO should establish a 
working group to begin planning for such assistance now. This working group could 
solicit resource allocations from member states, define mission goals and limitations, and 
devise an effective training plan for Libyan security forces. The foundational work for 
such a mission today could entail a rapid deployment of such forces if and when 
requested by the Libyan government in the future. Along these lines, the Alliance should 
establish a second working group to discuss and plan possible peace-keeping missions in 
Libya by NATO, or to consider what member states could contribute in the event of a 
UNSC-mandated and UN-led peace-keeping mission, though the likelihood of the latter 
scenario is remote at best. Whether NATO decides to aid the EU-led Operation Sophia or 
stays on the sidelines, Italy will likely play a key role, as it has the most at stake 
concerning the stability of Libya in the immediate and foreseeable future.   
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III. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MIGRANT CRISIS ON
ITALY 
Matteo Renzi, the prime minister of Italy, told a crowd at the World Economic 
Forum in January 2015 that “I am not here to present a future of tomorrow. For my 
country, the future is today, not tomorrow.”141 There is perhaps no more apt phrase to 
describe the current Italian economic situation. The Italian present is filled with 
numerous problems; unless resolution is found today, Italy’s tomorrow is uncertain at 
best. One fact rings true at present and in the immediate future for Italy: due to stagnant 
economic growth and the pressures of austerity, Italy does not possess the capability or 
resources to adequately respond, through all national facets of power, to the burgeoning 
humanitarian crisis off its coast for an indefinite period of time. Italy’s anemic economy, 
coupled with the Mediterranean migrant crisis, will thus drive Italy deeper into 
integration with and reliance on the European Union. An examination of the economic 
situation and future prospects for Italy, including the impact of the Mediterranean 
migrant crisis and the resources and capability the European Union offers through the 
CSDP, as well as assessing the current debate on fair burden sharing in the EU all lead to 
one conclusion: burden-sharing in the European Union will continue to grow out of 
economic necessity. Some EU members have resisted accepting that conclusion, as 
evidenced by the June 2016 Brexit vote in the United Kingdom.  
A. ITALIAN ECONOMY AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
Prior to the onset of the Mediterranean migrant crisis, Italy was beset by major 
problems, including the sovereign debt crisis of the Eurozone, as well as anemic 
economic growth.142 Numerous bank defaults, the shuttering of thousands of businesses, 
and the lingering effects of the 2008 global recession had a biting effect on the Italian 
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economy, which has been stagnant for years.143 Because Italy represents one of the 
largest economies in the EU, massive international loans or a bailout from the rest of the 
Eurozone would have put the EU in a precarious financial position by placing into 
question the viability of the greater economic union.144 Italy was thus forced to enact 
austerity measures by both cutting government spending and raising revenue via 
taxation.145  
Many economists, primarily from the Keynesian school of economic thought, 
argued against austerity measures in a time of economic contraction. Paul Krugman 
argues that during the time that Americans know as the “Great Recession,” the European 
Union advocated policies of austerity in several of its member states that were heavily 
debt-laden, forcing faltering economies into greater suffering.146 The European 
Commission’s directive of restraint or reduction in public spending in order to pay down 
national debt hit fragile economies, including Italy, particularly hard.147 Italy raised taxes 
on household income to nearly 45%, increased its Value-Added Tax (VAT), resurrected 
taxes on homes, and reformed its pension system.148 The tax measures further depressed 
consumption, while the pension reform left many on the cusp of retirement obliged to 
plan on retiring later in life.149  
Where has austerity left Italy economically? Despite its vast and harsh measures 
to raise revenue and cut its public spending, Italy has not been able to come up with 
annual budget surpluses. Since 2012, Italy has seen the share of debt vis-à-vis GDP 
increase every year, totaling approximately 130% of GDP in 2015.150 While Italy has 
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reduced the annual budget deficit from over 10% of GDP in 2012 to a projected 2.4% of 
GDP for 2016, it still will miss the mark called for by the European Commission for 
countries with over 60% debt vis-à-vis GDP to plan for budget surpluses.151 Unbudgeted 
expenses for national crises, such as falling back into recession or the burgeoning 
Mediterranean migrant crisis, leave Italy to simply add to its budget deficits, both 
annually and overall.  
Italy has yet to emerge from the sovereign debt crisis, but its economy has shown 
signs of higher growth since 2014, expanding by 1% in the last quarter of 2014.152 As the 
possibility of another global recession looms, Italy’s most recent gains may be fleeting. 
In the last quarter of 2015, the Italian economy grew by only 0.1%, failing to meet the 
growth of 0.3% forecast by many economists.153 Matteo Renzi argues that the austerity 
imposed by the European Commission is choking off additional economic progress in his 
country.154 Though the recent sovereign debt crisis and resulting austerity measures 
impede Italian economic growth, Italy has not performed well economically since joining 
the Eurozone.155 
Structural problems abound in the Italian economy, and they are compounded by 
a demographic picture that is dour at best. First, productivity has remained stagnant in 
Italy since 1998, and many hypotheses exist to explain the lackluster productivity.156 
While hypotheses diverge to account for the stagnant productivity,157 multiple sources 
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indicate that Italy must enact structural reforms to its labor market regulations to spur 
productivity.158 
Second, the Italian economy is ravaged by organized crime. The World Bank 
estimates that the “shadow economy,” which includes the Italian crime underworld, 
accounts for upward of 15% of total Italian GDP, or nearly €225 billion in 2000–2006.159 
According to a similar estimate, the crime underworld accounted for 16–17.5% of Italian 
GDP in 2008.160 Austerity would probably not be necessary in Italy if the government 
was able to collect taxes on the billions of Euros worth of illegal economic activities. The 
migrant crisis provides new opportunities for further illicit economic activity, and this is 
discussed in this chapter.  
Finally, Italian economic woes are compounded by two major long-term 
challenges: a demographic deficiency and the questionable solvency of its banks. Italy’s 
population share of older citizens is increasing quickly, and Italian birth rates are among 
the lowest in the European Union.161 Budget deficits will likely widen in the future when 
pensioners have fewer younger workers to support their entitlements. Moreover, some of 
Italy’s banks are at risk of insolvency. Despite its role as the fourth-largest economy 
within the EU, Italy’s banks are debt-laden to the tune of €360 billion, which equates to 
20% of the country’s GDP.162 Italian reserves to cover the cost of the burgeoning bad 
loans equates to approximately €160 billion, a mere 45% of the total bad debt.163 Renzi 
finds himself again at odds with Brussels over the ability of individual EU member states 
to bail out banks.164 Thus, the outlook for Italy is bleak without major reforms in a 
variety of sectors of the economy and society. 
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B. THE MEDITERRANEAN MIGRANT CRISIS COSTS TO ITALY 
One could argue that there is never a good time for a country to become saddled 
with a humanitarian crisis off of its shores, but Italy found itself in a particularly 
precarious and unenviable situation. In the face of the sovereign debt crisis, mounting 
annual budget deficits greater than European Union forecasts, and slow economic 
growth, Italy became ensnared in the throes of the largest migrant crisis since the end of 
World War II. Since 2012, tens of thousands of migrants have come ashore in Italy via 
maritime rescue. The economic toll of refugee support, through both naval rescue 
services and social welfare programs, has been large for the fiscally constrained Italian 
government. 
The Italian naval operation Mare Nostrum constituted a massive expenditure for 
the Italian government. Because this was a crisis response operation undertaken by a 
government that has engaged in continual deficit spending, it is unlikely that the money 
for the operation came from a hidden surplus or rainy day fund. Mare Nostrum lasted for 
approximately one year (October 2013 to October 2014) and cost approximately €9 
million per month, or €108 million for 12 months, due to the tremendous naval and air 
resources used on a nearly 24-hour basis.165 To put this into perspective, the proposed 
operational budget of the Italian military in its entirety was €1.16 billion for 2015.166 The 
European Union provided only €1.8 million toward Operation Mare Nostrum. Since Italy 
bore the costs of the operation nearly alone, the unsustainable financial burden was likely 
the cause for the operation’s shutdown in 2014.167 
While the cost of rescuing migrants off of the Italian coast was substantial, the 
costs of social welfare aid to the rescued migrants have been much greater. Though some 
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rescued migrants moved on to other countries in the European Union, mainly to Germany 
and Sweden, many have stayed in Italy to await a decision on their asylum status. As of 
October 2015, almost 100,000 migrants await results of their asylum application from the 
Italian government.168 The Italian government doles out hefty sums of money to pay for 
migrant housing, education, healthcare, and food, and pays businesses and other 
organizations that house migrants approximately €35 per day per adult.169 In 2015, these 
payments totaled €1.16 billion, which was nearly double the amount of money paid in 
2014.170 Further compounding the associated costs of migrant aid is the Italian 
government having to contend with mafia interference. Faced with a housing shortage to 
adequately shelter migrants, the Italian government has handed over an untold number of 
no-bid contracts to organizations with mafia ties.171 One man charged with corruption 
due to mafia association, Salvatore Buzzi, was recorded by investigators boasting that 
drug trafficking was less profitable than the migrant housing business.172 
A final Italian cost concerning the migrant crisis is through foreign policy. Italy 
has been attempting, within the larger European Union framework, to find a long-term 
solution that will slow the migrant crisis. One such solution was possibly negotiated with 
Turkey and came into effect in March 2016.173 Italy’s burden associated with the migrant 
crisis falls second only to that borne by Greece, as untold thousands have crossed 
overland through the Balkans or have made a short seaborne journey across the Aegean 
from Turkey to Greece. The European Union has sought help from Turkey to stem the 
flow of migrants through its lands, and was able to obtain Turkish assurances that it 
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would finally attempt to regulate the migratory flow.174 Turkish political concessions 
were made in return for European Union economic measures; in a quid pro quo deal, the 
European Union will provide Turkey with a migratory fund to help it deal with the tide of 
refugees, to the tune of €3 billion.175 In the initial years of disbursement, Italy will 
contribute roughly €225 million to the fund for Turkey,176 in exchange for the Turkish 
commitment to both stem migrant arrivals to Europe and take back any migrants that do 
not obtain asylum in an EU member state.177 
While the European Union’s migration fund for Turkey further adds to the Italian 
deficit and associated costs in dealing with the migrant crisis, Italy may see a bit of 
budgetary reprieve from the EU. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker 
left the possibility open for leeway regarding deficit targets for countries dealing with the 
migrant crisis, provided such countries could prove the impact of migration had caused 
unbudgeted spending.178 Matteo Renzi has long advocated such a policy, even initially 
withholding Italian support for an EU migratory fund for Turkey, in order to gain support 
for such a concession from the European Commission.179 Despite this reprieve, it is 
unclear if Renzi has the ability to effect the necessary structural changes to the Italian 
economy to kick-start growth and productivity. In the face of the migrant crisis, Italy has 
sought and must continue to look for other avenues to contend with the enormous 
financial burden caused by the crisis.  
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C. ITALY’S WAY FORWARD: COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE 
POLICY 
In the face of continuing economic difficulty and the mounting migrant crisis, 
Italy is looking to the European Union for aid in various forms. Italy will continue to seek 
relief in budget deficit targets due to the ongoing Mediterranean migrant crisis and will 
likely seek measures of economic aid as well. Without substantial economic reform and 
growth in Italy, the financial burden associated with the migrant crisis and its impact on 
the budget will be unsustainable. In this respect, there is a clear avenue available for 
relief to Italy, which is under the auspices of the European Union’s Common Security 
and Defense Policy.  
In the Treaty of Lisbon, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) was 
established so that the European Union could achieve an operational capacity that utilized 
both civilian and military assets from member states.180 The European Council votes to 
establish missions and member states will contribute to such missions according to their 
respective capabilities.181 Contributions can be made on an individual member state 
basis, or from a multinational force composed of member states that have entered into 
previous agreements with one another.182 To identify, support, and assess the operational 
needs of a mission established by the European Council, the Treaty of Lisbon tasked the 
European Defense Agency.183 
The top priority of the European Defense Agency (EDA) is the pooling and 
sharing of military assets, capabilities, and procurement across member states.184 The 
EDA outlines this priority in a fairly direct manner by addressing the shortcomings in 
European Union defense capability: 
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Recent operations have demonstrated critical gaps in European military 
capabilities. But while defense budgets are under pressure and investment 
is in decline, costs of major defense systems are rising. For European 
Member States cooperation in defense is the solution to acquire and 
maintain critical capabilities.185 
The EDA has thus identified one of the main problems in going forward with European 
defense: limited resources of member states in an ever-growing and increasingly complex 
security environment. Seizing on this fact, the EDA continues to push for increased 
capability-sharing, derived from the Ghent Initiative of 2010.186 
The Ghent Initiative is a German-Swedish “food for thought” proposal to increase 
“European defense cooperation.”187 Through cooperation and burden-sharing, the aim of 
the initiative is to more efficiently spend resources within the European Union to both 
preserve and enhance individual member state military capabilities and possibly broaden 
the scope of capabilities among all member states that participate.188 The approach of the 
Ghent Initiative entails three facets: to increase interoperability with the forces of a 
member state whose existence is predicated on a strictly national basis; to foster 
cooperation of member state forces but not promote crippling dependency; and to 
promote shared support structures for personnel training and education.189 The intent of 
all approaches is to streamline resources that can be used more efficiently if pooled, 
rather than used on a national basis, while remaining keenly aware and respectful of the 
political sensitivities for each member state that may arise from greater integration and 
cooperation.190 
The path forward for cash-strapped European Union member states is fairly clear: 
in the absence of robust economic growth in many EU countries, the rise of diverse 
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security concerns, and the continuing humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean, greater 
pooling of resources and the sharing of the security burdens must take place. At a 
minimum, coordination between member states can stop or slow down defense cuts in 
capabilities that would leave the European Union as a whole bereft of vital military 
functions. The European Defense Agency seeks to accomplish this, as well as to spur the 
pooling and sharing of resources to keep overall defense spending in Europe from being 
duplicative and wasteful.191 The institutional framework for potential success for smart 
European defense spending and collectivization is thus available and only waits for the 
domestic political will of various EU member states to evolve.  
D. ITALY AND THE CSDP 
Realizing its current situation and future outlook, the Italian government has 
almost no other option than to become an advocate for greater burden-sharing and 
resource pooling in the European Union on defense matters. Though it has few other 
viable alternatives to ensure adequate continued military capability, Italy has embraced 
its role and has become one of the largest proponents for greater EU integration and 
burden sharing. 
In a proposal from the Italian Ministry of Defense (MOD) in 2013 entitled “More 
Europe,” the Italian MOD makes a compelling case for greater burden sharing within the 
European Union.192 The Italian proposal is much more direct in its language than that of 
the Ghent Initiative. Advocating a stronger CSDP of greater efficiency, the Italian 
proposals cast the need for greater integration in dire, if not near-existential terms: “If the 
EU member states do not pool their efforts, where appropriate on certain common 
requirements or capabilities, none of them, nor Europe as a whole, will be able to 
guarantee its own security.”193 The authors of the proposal were careful to not advocate 
efforts duplicative of NATO.194 
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Acutely aware of the limiting factors posed by the country’s mounting debt and 
resulting austerity measures, the Italian Defense Ministry asserts in its proposal that 
“stronger and closer cooperation among EU states is required for both budgetary reasons 
and strategic rationale.”195 In a curiously worded passage, Italy admits to being broke, 
but advocates greater EU burden sharing because no matter the economic problems of 
today or tomorrow, security “challenges and instability are already here.”196 The Italian 
proposal goes even further in its calls for integration than the Ghent Initiative, and the 
striking language was sure to draw the ire of states concerned with the loss of sovereignty 
on defense capabilities due to greater European Union defense integration: 
The present phase of fiscal austerity, while affecting almost all MS’s 
[member states] and compelling a widespread reduction in defense 
budgets, should stimulate a growing political impetus to go for a more 
incisive interaction and integration of our militaries to accept some degree 
of interdependency.197 
The Italian Defense Ministry’s White Paper of 2015 echoed this sentiment by calling for 
the continued integration of European Union member states’ defense forces, stating that 
integration was the “cornerstone… for the protection of security and national defense.”198  
Despite Italy’s insistence on greater European defense integration and burden-
sharing, its efforts and pleas were met with the proverbial cold shoulder from the 
European Union when the Mediterranean migrant crisis began in earnest. As noted 
earlier, the Italian Naval Operation Mare Nostrum was a nearly Italian-only funded and 
operated crisis response mission. Despite pleas from Rome, the European Union was 
almost entirely unresponsive with the exception of a limited amount of funding.199 The 
Italian government effectively forced the issue of greater burden sharing to the forefront 
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when it shut down Operation Mare Nostrum. Italy was unable to continue funding the 
mission due to fiscal constraints, while the European Union was unwilling to authorize a 
robust successor mission due to its lack of political will. The crisis would continue to 
unfold in the face of a fairly meager and limited European response through FRONTEX 
Operation Triton.  
The inflection point with European Union reticence concerning a response to the 
migrant crisis was reached in April 2015. After over 700 migrants perished in the 
Mediterranean, marking one of the largest tragedies to date in the crisis, the European 
Council sprang to action.200 European Union Naval Forces Mediterranean was created to 
provide naval rescue services, as well as to disrupt the business model of the human 
trafficking network that had thrived since the downfall of Ghadafi and failure of the 
Libyan state. The European Council finally provided Italy the framework and resources 
necessary that constituted a European Union response to the crisis, vice a solely Italian 
response. Though Italy leads the mission, over 24 EU member states have contributed 
thus far to Operation Sophia.201 Major contributions of naval assets have come from 
Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom.202 All of 
the aforementioned countries have contributed air assets to the mission, as have Greece 
and Luxembourg.203 Common costs for Operation Sophia are €11.82 million for the first 
year of the operation, while the countries involved shoulder the burden of cost for their 
respective units taking part in the mission.204 When the European Council voted to 
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extend the mandate of Operation Sophia to late July 2017, it also authorized an additional 
€6.7 million to cover the common costs of the second year of the operation.205 
The success or failure of Operation Sophia rests on many factors outside the 
control of the operation itself—above all, political resolutions in both the Syrian and 
Libyan conflicts. In the Libyan case, the EU operation would need either a UN Security 
Council Resolution of approval or an invitation from the fractured Libyan government to 
enter Libyan territorial waters to conduct operations against human traffickers at the 
source, both of which are unlikely in the foreseeable future. Despite these facts, the 
creation of Operation Sophia can be viewed as a success. In terms of burden-sharing, 
Operation Sophia represents a model for future missions to address a security concern 
that affects all of the European Union. Operation Sophia allows financially burdened 
member states to contribute to European Union security operations without shouldering a 
disproportionate burden. Italy will likely hail this cooperation as a model for future 
operations as it continues to argue for greater European integration on defense matters.  
E. THE GREATER DEBATE OF EUROPEAN UNION BURDEN SHARING 
Although Italy has its own unique challenges concerning the Mediterranean 
migrant crisis, the crisis has also thrust the issue of burden sharing upon the entirety of 
the European Union. While security issues and crisis response have played a large role in 
the discussion concerning the pooling of resources and sharing the burden of response 
collectively, economic and physical factors play a large role as well. The EU is faced 
both with the economic challenge of how to respond in financially aiding member states 
bearing the brunt of the burden, but also the challenge of migrant distribution among EU 
member states.  
Through economic means, the European Union must aid member states that bear 
the bulk of the load of migrant influx due to their geographic location—namely Italy and 
Greece. Both countries have been in an economically precarious situation for years, and 
they serve as the gateway to Europe for the lion’s share of the migrants who enter the EU. 
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Burden sharing in the strictly economic sense has risen as an issue of great importance 
for both Italy and Greece due to their domestic economic outlook. The European Union 
has made progress in this arena by contributing financial aid to frontline nations of the 
migrant crisis. In March 2016, the European Commission proposed a €700 million aid 
package to Greece to defray costs associated with migrant housing and aid.206 This 
measure is in addition to one passed in August 2015, which authorized €2.4 billion to be 
paid out to EU member states for costs associated with the migrant crisis, of which Italy 
and Greece together were entitled to over one billion Euros.207 The migrant crisis has 
thus shaped the debate of EU burden sharing in a strictly economic sense; the role of 
migrant distribution among EU member states is much more contentious. 
In September 2015, the European Union passed a plan to relocate approximately 
120,000 migrants from Italy and Greece across the remaining EU member states.208 
While this was a good step forward in the debate about fair burden sharing, the plan’s 
implementation has thus far been a failure. As of March 2016, fewer than 1,000 of the 
120,000 migrants have been relocated within the broader EU, due in large part by the 
refusal of non-frontline EU member states to take in migrants.209 EU member states have 
thus “committed to burden sharing in principle but not in practice” concerning migrant 
relocation and distribution.210 The EU appeared to be more enthralled with the possibility 
of making a deal with Turkey to accept the return of migrants than to face the reality of 
the need for actual burden sharing among EU member states when it comes to migrant 
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hosting.211 Until rhetoric becomes reality and a plan of fair burden sharing of migrants 
can be implemented, the migrant crisis will continue to stoke the fires of the burden 
sharing debate.  
Italy offers a valuable case study of a financially constrained frontline nation of 
the Mediterranean migrant crisis. With a bleak economic outlook, the mounting pressure 
of debt and imposed austerity, and the burgeoning migrant crisis, Italy’s future is tied to a 
more integrated European Union in matters of defense and beyond. The framework 
presented by Germany and Sweden, and echoed by Italy, could both strengthen the 
European Union and reduce defense costs across member states, and the experience that 
Operation Sophia offers could serve as an example of success in resource pooling and 
defense burden sharing. The challenge posed by the migrant crisis will continue to make 
the need for burden sharing a major issue for the European Union. Greater burden sharing 
and integration hold the economic keys for both Italy and the European Union emerging 
stronger from the Mediterranean migrant crisis, while the current response of fractured 
muddling promises, at best, an unclear outcome. 
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IV. THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE MIGRANT 
CRISIS ON ITALY 
“If this is Europe,” an angry Matteo Renzi thundered to fellow European Union 
member state leaders, “you can keep it!”212 Renzi, the prime minister of Italy, has shown 
such exasperation with the EU many times throughout the Mediterranean migrant crisis. 
The effects of the crisis are far-reaching across the European Union and are a cause of 
significant debate and concern among all member states. Italy serves as a frontline nation 
in the crisis and, second to Greece, takes the brunt of the impact from thousands of 
migrants arriving on European shores. Economic and security concerns weigh heavily for 
all involved parties, but nothing is as palpable as the political fallout wrought by the 
crisis.  
Though the crisis’ full impacts will not be known for years to come, how has the 
Mediterranean migrant crisis affected the politics of Italy to date? The question poses two 
separate answers: domestically, the migrant crisis serves to buoy populist and Eurosceptic 
parties within Italy, while it may conversely serve to strengthen the Italian position in the 
international arena with the right approach. To adequately explore the aforementioned 
possibilities, one must briefly examine the national and political character of Italy, survey 
the domestic political developments concerning the migrant crisis, and evaluate the 
international political events surrounding the migrant crisis involving Italy. A thorough 
examination of all facets shows that developments from the migrant crisis put Italy in a 
precarious situation where it can either enjoy greater international prominence, or 
possibly see anti-migrant and anti-EU parties come to power. 
A. ITALIAN NATIONAL CHARACTER AND POLITICAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Many men of letters and social scientists have attempted to identify and brand the 
Italian national character. Alessandro Cavalli, in his work “Reflections on Political 
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Culture and the ‘Italian National Character,’” says that many of the attempts to tie values 
to the Italian national character are often misrepresentative of the society at large, or 
perpetuate unflattering stereotypes.213 Cavalli goes on to outline his own attributes of the 
Italian national character and describes it as one that is undergirded by a deep distrust in 
national government and its associated institutions.214 This penchant for distrust and 
skepticism in their own governmental institutions creates a legitimation deficit, in which 
(Cavalli says) the Italian public thinks that “everything that comes from above is bad” 
and perpetuates “the image of the governing class as incompetent and corrupt.”215 This 
notion is deeply rooted in all facets of public life, thus causing and sustaining the 
legitimation deficit. 
If most Italians view their government as bad, if not corrupt, then from where is 
legitimacy derived? Cavalli argues that greater Europe holds legitimacy in the eyes of 
most Italians.216 Luigi Barzini echoes Cavalli’s assessment of what constitutes legitimacy 
in many Italians’ view, further arguing that European integration is seen as the malady 
for poor governance in Italy.217 Barzini says that this view is so deep and widespread that 
“this is why Italian ministers in Brussels do not make waves, often accept decisions 
unfavorable to their country without complaining, and act as arbiters and pacifiers 
between contending parties.”218 Despite the propensity of the Italians to search for 
legitimacy outside of their own borders, Cavalli argues that the Italian national character 
“hides the desire to draw closer and fear of moving away.”219 This characteristic brings 
with it an envy of other European nations such as the France, Germany, and the United 
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Kingdom, leading to an Italian tendency to point out the supposed flaws of the 
aforementioned nations as they arise.220 
Italian misgivings about government appear to be the only shared characteristic 
among its people. Political fragmentation constituted a formative experience for the 
Italian nation and has been perpetuated since its formation.221 Its various models of 
government, including its latest republic, have been top-down imposed systems rather 
than benefitting from bottom-up sources of legitimacy.222 Ernesto Galli della Loggia 
argued that the continuing political fragmentation of Italy leaves it with “a weak sense of 
identity as a nation.”223 In the face of mass migration from Albania during the Balkans 
Crisis of the mid 1990s, Galli della Loggia scathingly assessed that Italy was “incapable 
of addressing even the simplest issues of national solidarity, or of economic assistance to 
others.”224 This lack of solidarity gave rise to the Northern League, or Lega Nord, a 
northern-based Italian political party that masked xenophobic and separatist rhetoric in 
folksy and populist charm.225 Biocca argues that a corruption scandal of the political 
class in the 1990s further fueled Lega Nord’s popularity and the desire for further 
European integration.226  
The Lega Nord was able to gain political power in Italy due to the low electoral 
threshold percentage for political parties. Italy’s electoral threshold is only 2% for parties 
to gain seats in its Chamber of Deputies.227 This setup leads to the existence of many 
political parties in Italy, which have tended to form coalitions with center-left and center-
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right parties since the mid-1990s.228 The major parties include the left-wing Democratic 
Party, and the recently created anti-establishment Five Star Movement, which gained 
electoral prominence in 2013 by exploiting the anger at the center-right and left parties. 
With the addition of Lega Nord, the aforementioned parties constitute the main players in 
Italian politics, and the latter two parties will be examined in greater detail later. 
While fragmentation, corruption, and internal discord mark Italy’s domestic 
politics, how is Italy’s foreign policy shaped? The point of departure for an examination 
of Italian foreign policy is the end of the Cold War. Filippo Andreatta makes a 
compelling argument for the Italian position, using an approach of both political science 
and geographic reality to construct the necessities of Italian foreign policy. Since the end 
of the Cold War and its bi-polar system, “multipolar systems produce segmented systems 
in which ‘both peace and war’ are likely to coexist in different places” simultaneously.229 
This fact is not lost on the Italian government, since Italy is situated in precarious 
“geostrategic proximity” to the conflict hotspots of the Balkans, the Middle East, and 
North Africa.230 In this regard, Italy is presented with an almost unique security 
challenge compared to much of the rest of the European Union, as it must contend, like 
Greece, with the spillover effects caused by conflict to its eastern and southern 
borders.231  
Andreatta further argues that the aforementioned effects may not initially register 
on the radar of Italy’s European or international allies, despite the fact that foreign 
conflicts’ spillover effects can pose a risk of destabilizing Italy internally.232 Security 
circumstances in the last 25 years have led to an Italian shift in foreign policy. As 
Andreatta aptly states, “Italy has made a break with postwar policies . . . Italy can no 
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longer afford to keep a low profile; the risk of facing a regional conflict without 
necessarily receiving automatic support from its allies has forced Rome out of its 
shell.”233 Mark Gilbert echoes Andreatta’s sentiment, arguing that Italy has pursued a 
much more active role in the Mediterranean region over the past decade.234 This newly 
active role, driven by its geographic location, places Italy in competition with France in 
the Mediterranean.235 Italy has increased its involvement in both international institutions 
and unilateral action to combat regional instability in the last ten years, hoping to boost 
its position in the international arena.236 Its national characteristic of envy toward France 
and Germany carries over into its foreign policy, as Italy’s role as a secondary power in 
the global arena vis-à-vis its more powerful European allies is a source of Italian 
consternation.237 
B. ASSESSING THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE 
MIGRATION CRISIS ON ITALY 
The Mediterranean migrant crisis that continues to unfold in and around Italy 
remains one of the largest unsolved problems for the country. Hundreds of thousands of 
migrants have reached Italy’s southern shores since 2013, and more are sure to follow in 
the years ahead due to the chaos in both Syria and Libya. The Italian government, faced 
with austerity measures imposed by the European Union due to its debt crisis, has been 
limited in its ability to adequately respond to the crisis. The political effects of the crisis 
continue to unfold, but several data points exist to assess possible trends. Through an 
examination of Italian public opinion, the rise of the populist and Eurosceptic Five-Star 
Movement, and the Italian regional election results that bolstered Lega Nord, the trend 
shows that the migrant crisis is having a definitive impact on politics in Italy; the trend 
does not bode well for Matteo Renzi and his incumbent Democratic Party. 
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How do Italians feel about the migrant crisis? To answer this question, one must 
look to opinion polls. In May 2014, during the migration season in the Mediterranean 
when the Italian Navy was conducting Operation Mare Nostrum, the Pew Research 
Center endeavored to gauge Italian attitudes about migration. When Italians were asked if 
they preferred less, more, or the same amount of immigrants let into their country, a 
resounding 80% said they preferred less immigration.238 Italian ranked second only to 
Greece (87%) with this sentiment, and was followed by a distant third in France 
(57%).239 The spread between political ideologies in Italy was only 16%, with 77% of 
left wing Italians and 88% of right wing Italians sharing the same sentiment about 
immigration levels.240 Seventy-seven percent of Italians did not think that immigrants 
attempt to assimilate into Italian culture, while 69% of Italians felt that immigrants were 
an economic burden that either used too many welfare benefits or took native Italian 
jobs.241 A spring 2015 Pew Research Center poll revealed that 61% of Italians had a 
negative view of Muslims in their country, an opinion made relevant by the fact that 
many migrants are Muslims.242 
Migrants are not the only topic that registers negatively in Italian public opinion. 
As the country has been constrained both financially and militarily in its response to the 
migrant crisis, Italy looked to the European Union for aid to soften the impact of the 
crisis. Thus, far, the EU has been fairly tepid in its response and aid, primarily through 
the paltry sum it offered to fund Operation Mare Nostrum, its slow response to aid Italy 
militarily with the humanitarian and search and rescue operation in the Mediterranean, 
and the European Union’s almost complete inability to relocate large numbers of 
migrants from Italy to other EU member states. In spring 2015, the Eurobarometer 
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registered that over 35% of Italians felt that their country would fare better apart from the 
European Union, which made them second in this sentiment only to the United 
Kingdom.243 Italian confidence in the European Union has fallen from over 70% in 2008, 
to around 45% in 2015.244 One businessman from Parma, Roberto Leoni, described 
Italian sentiment by saying that “our skepticism isn’t against Europe, it’s about how 
things have gone. We should not pursue an exit but we just don’t feel safeguarded by 
Europe and we need to be appreciated a bit more.”245 
C. POPULISM AND EUROSCEPTICISM OF THE FIVE STAR MOVEMENT 
As Euroscepticism grows in Italy, due in part to both European Union-imposed 
austerity and the incoherent EU response to the migrant crisis, opposition parties are 
attempting to wield these issues as a political sword against Renzi’s incumbent 
government. The Five Star Movement (FSM) is one such organization that engages in 
anti-immigrant rhetoric. Its leader, Beppe Grillo, railed against the Italian government in 
2013 in a discussion of reforming a law that made irregular immigration illegal.246 
Essentially blasting the move by the parliament as an open-door policy, Grillo blogged, 
“this amendment is an invitation to migrants from Africa and the Middle East to head for 
Italy . . . how many immigrants can we accommodate if one Italian in eight does not have 
money?”247 This statement is fairly mild compared to other blog posts by Grillo, which 
include a comparison of migrants to rats, and a photo posted of the Interior Minister 
“blacked up” as Grillo proceeded to lambast the immigration policies of the 
government.248  
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Grillo and his Five Star Movement engage in what Paolo Franzosi, Francesco 
Marone, and Eugenio Salvati term “strategic Euroscepticism.”249 They posit that FSM’s 
rhetoric is 
Built on strategic-tactical positioning in party competition, such as “the 
politics of the opposition,” based on a government-opposite dynamic, and 
the incentives and constraints offered by domestic political institutions and 
rules. At present, the “strategic” explanation seems to be more useful to 
understand FSM’s Euroscepticism.250 
The FSM is thus taking advantage of the shifts in Italian public opinion regarding the 
European Union and adopting a position that it hopes will bring it political gain. This 
strategic skepticism, or political opportunism, began in the months prior to the Italian 
general election of 2013 and has recurred in various instances since.251 Despite the 
FSM’s Euroscepticism not having “a specific and sound ideological base,”252 it went on 
to garner more votes than any other political party (25.52%) in the Italian general election 
of 2013.253  
D. LEGA NORD: FROM FRINGE PARTY TO POLITICAL CONTENDER 
An Italian political party that does not lack an ideological base in anti-immigrant 
policy and Euroscepticism is the Lega Nord (LN). Formed in the early 1990s as a party 
that advocated northern secession from the remainder of Italy, the LN has had some 
semblance of representation in the Italian parliament for the better part of the last quarter 
century.254 Whereas the FSM seems to exploit the anxieties caused by the migration 
crisis as a matter of political opportunism, the LN would likely not enjoy the prominence 
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it has today without the migrant crisis, as it has been espousing xenophobic rhetoric for 
years.255 Manuela Caiani and Nicolo Conti posit that the LN has used its relative power 
in government, as a coalition partner of Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, to make Italian 
immigration laws more stringent.256 Party documents and public rhetoric since the LN’s 
founding interweave a fear of Italian cultural loss through both European integration and 
the “flood of immigrants.”257 The party is particularly hostile to Muslim migrants and 
peppers its rhetoric with Crusades-era language, as it warns against the “invasion of 
immigrants” of Islam.258  
The Lega Nord’s unapologetically xenophobic and nationalist rhetoric has always 
gained attention, but now it is seeing a resurgence in political support. The LN’s leader, 
Matteo Salvini, has seen his approval ratings rise slowly since taking the helm at the LN 
in 2013.259 Salvini has worked to transform the LN from a regional party to one with 
national political aspirations, and he has also benefitted from the relative disintegration of 
Berlusconi’s last center-right coalition.260 In late 2013, Salvini’s re-tooled LN was able 
to eclipse Berlusconi’s Forza Italia in regional elections in Emilia-Romagna.261 In the 
2015 Italian regional elections, the Lega Nord topped its previous electoral gains and was 
able to make electoral inroads to regions once considered bastions of left-wing support, 
capturing the plurality of the vote in Matteo Renzi’s home region of Tuscany.262 Polling 
in January 2016 indicates that the LN has the support of 16–17% of the Italian public.263 
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Though the LN falls well below the support enjoyed by Renzi’s Democratic Party and the 
FSM, if new elections were held, Salvini could possibly oust Renzi with a coalition of 
right-wing parties.264 The Lega Nord has thus gone from being in 2013 a regional, fringe 
right-wing party nearly requiring life support, to becoming a party that could pose a 
significant contention for power. With its rhetoric against migrants based in ideology, as 
well as its railings against the European Union, the Lega Nord has risen due in large part 
to the fear and anxiety situated around the Mediterranean migrant crisis.  
The rise of the Five Star Movement and the resurgence of the Lega Nord have 
mostly come from the anxieties and dismay over the European Union’s ineffectual 
response to the migrant crisis. The EU’s response to the migration crisis has been 
incoherent at best. Because the Italians have long placed faith in the legitimacy of EU 
institutions, since they suffer from their own legitimation problems with Italian 
institutions, the European Union had a chance to promote deeper integration and display 
the benefits of EU membership when the crisis arose. The inadequate EU response to the 
migration crisis, coupled with ongoing EU-imposed austerity, has made many Italians 
simply lose faith in the European Union. This loss of trust has opened the door for 
political parties that are both Eurosceptic and harshly anti-immigrant, as the two positions 
nearly go hand-in-hand. What effect has the rise of these two parties, buoyed by 
Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant fervor, had on the incumbent government of Matteo 
Renzi? 
E. DOMESTIC POLITICAL REALITY ALTERS ITALIAN FOREIGN 
POLICY 
When Matteo Renzi came to power in 2014, Italy was in the throes of the migrant 
crisis. It had just launched Operation Mare Nostrum a few months prior and was 
continuing to see thousands of migrants come ashore in its southern regions. Renzi and 
Italy were essentially dealing with the crisis alone: Mare Nostrum was a nearly Italian-
only funded operation, as the EU contributed financial aid that accounted for only 2% of 
the operation’s cost. A political solution to the crisis was nowhere in sight and continues 
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to remain elusive as of September 2016. Renzi was thus confronted with a political 
conundrum, as Italy could not bear the burden of the migrant crisis alone in the era of 
austerity. Faced with limited resources and a humanitarian crisis that had no end in sight, 
Renzi set out to make the case for European Union assistance to Italy. 
Operation Mare Nostrum was launched before Renzi took the reins of power in 
Italy. Hundreds of migrants were dying at sea, sometimes on a daily basis, and Italy had 
to act with or without European Union involvement or aid. Renzi and his cabinet shut 
down Mare Nostrum when it reached its twelve-month mark. They had been arguing for 
months that the Mediterranean migrant crisis was a European problem, vice a solely 
Italian issue.265 This action effectively thrust the issue of European solidarity to the 
forefront. If the EU was not going to help Italy contend with the crisis in a major way, 
was it going to sit back and watch thousands of migrants perish at sea? Since FRONTEX 
Operation Triton’s assets paled in comparison to those of Mare Nostrum, the EU faced a 
mounting death toll of migrants in the Mediterranean in the spring of 2015. The European 
Council convened and established European Union Naval Force Mediterranean, and 
installed Italy as the lead country in what would later be called Operation Sophia. The 
goal of a European Union response to the humanitarian aspect of the crisis was finally 
realized by Renzi, though it had taken high loss of human life to attain. 
The shifting of Italian public opinion caused by the slow and meandering 
response of the European Union to the migrant crisis marks a much more boisterous and 
assertive Italian tone in foreign policy. In June 2015, after the creation of EUNAVFOR 
Med, Renzi continued his criticism of the EU’s slow response, especially when it came to 
migrant relocation outside of Italy. When a proposal was floated by the European 
Commission to transfer a paltry sum of 24,000 migrants from Italy, Renzi reacted by 
saying that such a low sum was “almost a provocation.”266 He went on to say that, “if 
Europe chooses solidarity, good. If it doesn’t, we have Plan B ready. But it would first 
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and foremost hurt Europe.”267 Renzi did not proceed to describe what such plans would 
entail. When pressed on the subject, Renzi’s Interior Minister, Angelino Alfano, simply 
said that, “if Europe is not supportive, it will find itself dealing with a different Italy. We 
will not accept a selfish Europe.”268 Italy’s more assertive tone has been noticed in 
Brussels. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker stated in January 2016 
that “the atmosphere between Italy and the rest of the EU is not at its best at the moment. 
By the end of February, I will be going to Italy because I have to tackle the issue 
myself.”269 Specifically addressing his professional relationship with Renzi, Juncker 
simply said, “I keep my rancor [with Renzi] in my pocket.”270 It would seem that Renzi 
has unleashed a tidal wave of Italian frustration on Brussels, which is a far cry from 
Barzini’s assertion that Italian ministers avoid making waves. 
Renzi’s rhetoric, which has at times festered with vitriol toward the EU and 
Germany, is not merely empty blustering to express growing Italian popular unease with 
the European Union. Renzi is using his position to wield influence within the EU in order 
to bring some fiscal relief to his country. A once promising alliance with German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel has faced some rough patches over the last year, as Renzi has 
sought concessions from the EU to benefit his domestic agenda.271 Remarking on the 
latest EU attempts to broker a deal with Turkey regarding the migrant crisis, Renzi stated 
that, “if one wants a pan-European strategy to resolve the refugee crisis, then it’s not 
enough for Angela to call Hollande and Juncker and for me to read about it in the 
press.”272 These words were translated into action when Italy put a freeze on over €200 
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million of Italian aid meant for Turkey to stem the flow of migrants to Greece.273 Since 
Renzi is not the only European leader that must contend with uneasy public opinion at 
home, he leveraged his position against German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who also 
needs a resolution of the migrant crisis due to waning poll numbers.274 Italy’s newfound 
and feisty voice within the European Union has achieved some important concessions 
favorable to Rome. 
Italy is at an important point in its post-Cold War political development. Faced 
with an unforeseeable end to one of the largest humanitarian crises since the end of the 
Second World War, Italy’s hope in the European Union is faltering. Anti-immigrant and 
Eurosceptic forces are growing within the country, due in large part to the lack of 
significant aid from the once-vaunted European Union to help Italy absorb the shock of 
many migrants’ arrival. Recognizing this turn of events, Prime Minister Matteo Renzi 
embarked on a mission to garner EU concessions for aid to his country. Such an endeavor 
was one of both political and financial necessity, for Italy cannot continue to wade 
through the crisis alone, and Renzi would not be likely to last if that remained the case. 
After recently mending ties with Germany and garnering support for a loosening of EU 
financial constraints on Italy, Renzi alluded to Germany and Italy sharing a common 
enemy in the form of populism.275 Time will tell if Renzi’s newfound and pugnacious 
tone will quell the rising tide of populism in his country, and if the concessions he has 
sought are enough to reverse the growing unease of the Italian people with their role in 
the European Union. Tone alone will not keep Renzi in power, and continued unfettered 
immigration into Italy will only boast his political rivals, particularly the Lega Norde. 
Real results with tangible outcomes are the factors that hold the most promise for Renzi 
to hold power and effectively counter the growing anti-immigrant fervor of the Italian 
public.  
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V. ITALIAN MIGRATION POLICY AND THE PROSPECTS OF 
REFUGEE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
The Mediterranean Sea, which evokes images of sunny vacations and a temperate 
climate, serves as a nautical graveyard for thousands of desperate people. During the last 
week of May and the beginning of June 2016, as the weather in the Mediterranean gave 
way to summer, the death toll from crossing attempts from North Africa to Italy was 
1,000.276 This doubled the total for 2016 to over 2,000 lives lost in attempts to cross the 
Mediterranean Sea.277 With the so-called boating season reaching its peak, thousands of 
people are fleeing the shores of Northern Africa for Europe across the Mediterranean in 
search of better living and economic conditions. The closest European nation north of 
Libya with the means to receive migrants is Italy; its geographic proximity to conflict-
riddled states makes it one of the primary destinations for the desperate. In the months 
after the EU-Turkey refugee deal in March 2016, Italy surpassed Greece in the total 
number of refugee arrivals.278 The crisis began after the Arab Spring (with the aid of 
NATO) swept away Muammar Ghadafi and his regime in Libya in October 2011. Libya 
became a failed state with a divided and ineffectual government. Libya also became a 
springboard for the pent-up demand caused by war, economic deprivation, and state 
oppression across Africa and the Middle East. The migrant crisis since 2013 continues 
nearly unabated, and no plausible political or military solution is in sight.  
Despite the gloomy prospects of continued conflict and poor conditions in the 
vicinity of the Mediterranean Sea, the crisis possesses a silver lining for Italy. Economic 
and demographic stagnancy took root in Italy in the last few years of the 20th century, 
but the current situation has the potential to alleviate many of Italy’s long-term problems. 
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A coherent response backed by a sound economic integration policy possesses the ability 
to turn the migrant crisis into an opportunity for Italy, through both boosting the economy 
and solving the demographic problem for the Italian state. An examination of refugee 
economic integration, Italy’s asylum and refugee aid policy, the European Union’s 
policy, and the various positive impacts refugees can have on host countries will show 
that Italy has a golden opportunity to restructure and revitalize its country through the 
opportunity presented by the current Mediterranean crisis. 
References to both a migrant and refugee crisis describe the situation in the 
Mediterranean. Refugees are people “displaced by persecution, war, or conflict, who 
have fled across an international border and are in need of humanitarian assistance” 
according to Karen Jacobsen.279 According to the UN, a migrant is someone who goes to 
another country, usually to find work and improve his or her economic conditions.280 
Both terms correctly describe the current crisis affecting Italy. The bulk of this work will 
address the refugee aspects of the crisis, but it will also discuss economic migrants. 
A. THE PROSPECT OF REFUGEES AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Before assessing the prospects of economic integration for refugees within Italy, 
one must first address the feasibility of successful refugee integration on a macro level. 
Can refugees have a positive effect on host communities or do they constitute a drain on 
host nation resources? The answer to this question lies primarily in the way that states 
handle refugee influxes, but promising examples demonstrate that refugees can be 
constructively integrated into host community economies and show a willingness and 
ability to work, even in the direst of circumstances. An examination of refugee camps in 
Somalia and Uganda, along with an analysis of integrative state policies, will show that 
hosting refugees can have a positive effect on a host nation’s economy. 
In examining the economic activity of refugees in Somalia in the 1980s, Gaim 
Kibreab confronted the notion of “refugee dependency syndrome,” a belief that was 
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present in both the Somali host government and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).281 This syndrome is characterized by a lack of motivation and general lethargy 
among the refugee population, which stems from a dependence on aid handouts from the 
host government, other governments, or international organizations.282 The dependency 
syndrome was a widely held belief in Somalia, but Kibreab notes that despite the deeply 
entrenched idea, refugees in Somalia “were not only willing to work; they worked, often 
for infinitesimal returns, whenever opportunities existed.”283 Kibreab argues that, while 
many refugees could not achieve self-sufficiency through their work due to the small 
profits and thus continued to receive aid, the refugees in the aggregate were anything but 
lazy or lethargic. 
Kibreab found that refugees are often not content with just having their basic 
needs met, but seek goods and services that satisfy a materialistic craving.284 In order to 
procure more goods and despite the small returns, 75% of refugees engaged in some type 
of income-generating activity, whether it be farming, trade, or labor.285 Kibreab further 
notes that refugee settlements near Somali communities helped breathe life into once 
stagnant villages; economic activity increased due to the newfound market, in which 
refugees played a large role in new commercial ventures.286 Refugees in Somalia also 
showed a propensity to grow their own food when the local land would support such 
ventures. As temporary circumstances gave way to long-term displacement, refugees 
showed a strong desire to engage in agricultural activity so their food would be fresh and 
of desirable nutritional value, since that given by aid agencies was questionable in both 
regards.287 Kibreab concludes that the most successful refugee settlements were those 
where NGOs fostered an environment of assistance based on business principles and skill 
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development, leading to the overall observation that if refugees are given the tools and 
placed in environments conducive to economic and agricultural activities, they will seek 
self-sufficiency.288 
Research conducted nearly two decades after Kibreab’s study by the University of 
Oxford’s Humanitarian Innovation Project (HIP) of refugees in Uganda led to similar 
findings. Uganda hosts several hundred thousand refugees, of which Congolese and 
Somali refugees comprise the majority.289 HIP’s research dispels several myths about 
refugee economics and ultimately concludes that refugees can have a positive and lasting 
effect on the economies of host nations. 
The first myth that HIP’s research dispels is that of economic isolation among 
refugee settlements. Across several regions and cities with refugee settlements close by, 
HIP “encountered many clear indicators of economic interdependence between refugees 
operating” in markets and regional trading centers.290 This is even in spite of the 
geographic isolation of the refugee settlements in Nakivale and Kyangwali, Uganda, as 
well as the poor infrastructure for mobility.291 Ugandan nationals, with government 
permission, travel to the aforementioned refugee settlements due to the high quality of 
maize grown by the refugees. Ugandan nationals purchase the maize for personal 
consumption or act as middlemen for further distribution.292 Somali refugees present in 
the same settlements will often lease their plots of land to other refugees in return for 
profits, which are then invested in shops for various trading goods.293 
A second myth that HIP dispels about refugees through its research is the notion 
that refugees are necessarily a burden on host communities. Survey results on the origin 
of refugee- purchased goods showed that of rural-settled refugees, 68% purchased goods 
                                                 
288 Ibid., 347.  
289 Alexander Betts et al., “Refugee Economies: Rethinking Popular Assumption,” University of 
Oxford, Refugee Studies Centre, June 2014, https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/publications/other/refugee-
economies-2014.pdf: 7.  
290Alexander Betts, “Refugee Economies,” 11.  
291 Ibid., 11  
292 Ibid., 13.  
293 Ibid., 14.  
 63
from Ugandan nationals, while urban-settled refugees purchased goods from Ugandan 
nationals at a rate of 97%—all on a daily basis.294 Survey results also revealed that 
among refugee entrepreneurs, 14% (rural-settled) to 40% (urban-settled) of their 
employees are Ugandan nationals.295 Refugees also worked for Ugandan employers.296 
A third myth dispelled by HIP is that of refugee dependency. Expanding on 
Kibreab’s work, HIP’s research revealed a marked disparity between aid given to 
refugees, based primarily on locality. A whopping 83% of survey respondents received 
some assistance from international organizations if they were settled in rural areas, while 
78% of refugees settled in urban environments received no aid from international 
organizations.297 Despite the differences in fortune between the two groups, only 1% of 
rural-settled refugees live on international aid assistance alone, while the majority use it 
to supplement their income.298 Due to a dearth of micro-loans and a general non-
availability of start-up capital, many refugees find rather creative ways to procure the 
capital necessary for starting their own businesses. Personal savings, community lending 
organizations, inter-refugee pooling and loans, and social insurance programs are a few 
of the options that refugees in Uganda resort to in order to finance new businesses or to 
aid the particularly vulnerable members of society.299 Despite the limited availability of 
funds or resources, long-term Ugandan refugees continue to seek a degree of self-reliance 
despite the obstacles present. 
After a review of these two specific examples of examining refugees in an 
economic context, it is necessary to examine refugee trends of settlement and economics 
at the macro level. Karen Jacobsen argues that the majority of refugees will “remain in 
their country of first asylum for years as the civil strife and insecurity in their home 
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countries plays out.”300 In such “protracted situations,” refugees will either self-settle 
among the host nation populace, or will be formally settled by the host nation 
government if it has the capacity.301 Jacobsen opines that the manner in which a refugee 
settles will determine the economic integration (or lack thereof) that a specific refugee 
experiences.302 The United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention lays out the economic 
rights of refugees within a host country, but since state sovereignty trumps such 
commitments, many signatory nations do not entirely implement the economic provisions 
concerning the rights of refugees.303 Jacobsen states that, despite the protection provided 
by the Convention,  
It is increasingly common for host governments to restrict all kinds of 
economic activities by refugees outside designated camp areas, in an effort 
to discourage permanence and encourage repatriation. If legislation does 
not exist, host governments usually issue regulations concerning where 
refugees should live, and their freedom to move around, seek work, and 
access social services. In recent years, an increasingly restrictive climate 
has prevailed in many key host countries.304 
Host government policy thus plays the largest role in shaping the context for the 
economic activities in which refugees engage. Such activity exists in two realms: the 
legal and the illicit.305 The legal domain is the area that refugees engage in under 
government purview and thus is activity approved by the host nation and is often enabled 
and aided by NGOs. The second domain is illicit activity, occurring within the shadow 
economy of a state. This can encompass all sorts of illegal activity, from simple 
agricultural plots in unauthorized areas of the host nation, to prostitution and human 
trafficking.306 As a host nation becomes more restrictive of the economic ventures that 
                                                 
300 Karen Jacobsen, The Economic Life of Refugees (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, 2005): 2.  
301 Jacobsen, Economic Life of Refugees, 2.  
302 Ibid., 7.  
303 Jacobsen, Economic Life of Refugees, 14.  
304 Ibid., 15.  
305 Karen Jacobsen, “Livelihoods in Conflict: The Pursuit of Livelihoods by Refugees and the Impact 
on the Human Security of Host Communities,” International Migration 40, no. 4 (2002), dio: 
10.1111/1468-2435.00213. 
306 Ibid.  
 65
refugees can pursue, one is likely to see a rise in illegal activity by the refugees. 
Favorable host nation policy is often the best and last hope for people who are usually 
without assets and that also lack the ability to easily procure cash or credit.307  
Perhaps the largest and oftentimes most unknown factor concerning economic 
integration and refugees is the nature of their presence in a host country. Will a crisis that 
produces an influx of refugees become a long-term challenge, or a short-term flare up of 
circumstance? The answer to this question is fairly straightforward: once refugees enter a 
country, they are likely to stay for a long time, if not permanently. The reasons for 
protracted stays are threefold: under the protection of the non-refoulement principle in 
international law, host nations are not to return refugees to their homeland, owing to the 
danger of persecution.308 The second reason is that the repatriation of refugees after it is 
safe to re-enter a former conflict region is to occur on a voluntary basis.309 Host nations 
may find policy “workarounds” to spur repatriation through visa controls and other 
avenues, but as signatories of the 1951 Refugee Convention, are not supposed to force 
outright the repatriation of the refugees they may be hosting.310 The last consideration 
reflects the fact that refugees may simply not want to return to their country of origin for 
a number of reasons, including bleak economic prospects upon return. Refugees may 
regard their lives in a host country as holding more promise than repatriation,311 a notion 
recently documented by the Financial Times. Immediately after that failed Turkish putsch 
of July 2016, a number of Syrian refugees were on record decrying the coup, as the 
possibility of regime change could entail deportation to Syria.312 
While a conflict that produces an influx of refugees may appear to be short-lived 
in nature, refugees are more likely to stay in a host nation than return home. State 
policymakers must acknowledge the near-permanence of a refugee presence and should 
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thus address the need for long-term solutions in response to a refugee influx. Once the 
initial furor caused by a refugee influx abates, refugees will remain in a country. This 
likely persistent presence raises the question for a government: what should “we” do? 
Since refugees show the ability to positively affect a host nation’s economy, it is not 
difficult to conceive of a scenario in which a state implements a long-term solution that is 
beneficial to itself and the refugees alike. 
B. ITALY’S ASYLUM POLICY 
With the EU-Turkey refugee deal in place in March 2016, Italy surpassed Greece 
in seaborne arrivals of people from the Mediterranean. Unlike Greece, Italy must cope 
with arrivals from not only the Middle East, but from Africa as well. In order to 
determine the efficacy of Italy’s asylum policy, it is first necessary to conduct a policy 
overview. Italy’s policy concerning asylee benefits warrants further examination to assess 
the prospects of economic integration. Finally, Italian policy on refugees does not exist 
solely in the context of domestic policy, as it must interface with the European Union, 
specifically concerning the Dublin Regulation and proposed EU refugee relocation 
programs. The interplay of domestic and international policy creates a precarious 
situation for Italy as a host nation to refugees and helps to further muddy the waters when 
it comes to finding an effective long term solution for the current crisis. 
In 2015, over 150,000 migrants reached the shores of Italy.313 During the first 
nine months of 2015, Italy processed nearly 60,000 asylum or temporary protection 
applications, of which the Italian government rejected over 24,000.314 Another 50,000 
applications were in the queue for state review by the end of September 2015.315 The 
countries of origin for asylum applications in Italy are, in descending order, Nigeria, 
Gambia, Pakistan, Senegal, Bangladesh, Mali, Afghanistan, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, 
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Guinea, Syria, Eritrea, Somalia, and Kosovo.316 The majority of applications of people 
from Afghanistan, Guinea, Syria, Eritrea, and Somalia gained approval, while over 50% 
of the other asylum requests were rejected.317 It is reasonable to assume that the 
approximately 50,000 who entered Italy and did not put in an application for asylum 
either moved on to other countries in Europe or remained in Italy outside of the official 
cognizance of the Italian government. Nearly 90% of the processed applications 
originated with men, regardless of country of origin.318 
The process for claiming asylum in Italy is fairly straightforward on paper, but in 
actuality is lengthy and onerous. The application process starts at either the border, or in 
regional offices within Italy.319 Italian law establishes no time limit on when a person 
may file a claim for asylum, but suggests a “general rule” of filing a claim within eight 
days of entering Italy.320 In the regional offices, those seeking asylum formally register 
after the completion of fingerprints and photographs.321 While police cannot assess the 
legitimacy of asylum claims, they do ask a series of questions to determine if an asylum-
seeker’s application falls under the auspices of the Dublin Regulation.322 Provided that 
Italy is the country that holds the responsibility for processing an asylum request, the 
asylum-seeker will return to the regional office for further paperwork.323 The regional 
police offices will then forward the necessary paperwork to Territorial Commissions or 
Sub-commissions for International Protection (Commissioni territoriali per il 
riconoscimento della protezione internazionale) (CTRPI) who are “the only authorities 
competent for the substantive asylum interview” and who work under the guidance of the 
“National Commission for the Right of Asylum (Commissione nazionale per il diritto di 
                                                 
316 Ibid.  
317 Ibid.  
318 Ibid., 7.  
319 Ibid., 17.  
320 de Donato, “Country Report: Italy,” 18.  
321 Ibid.  
322 Ibid.  
323 Ibid.  
 68
asilo) (CNDA).”324 This entire process can take up to eighteen months before a decision 
is made regarding an asylum-seeker.325 Expedited procedures exist when a number of 
criteria are met by an asylum seeker and can drastically reduce the amount of time taken 
to make a decision regarding a particular application.326 Those denied asylum are told to 
vacate the country voluntarily, but many do not possess the means to do so.327  
In principle, asylum seekers have nearly unrestricted access to most services 
available to Italian citizens; in practice, however, the Italian state is severely limited in its 
ability to provide adequate support to asylum seekers. First, asylum seekers are allowed 
to work 60 days after making their asylum requests.328 Integration and vocational 
programs provided by various entities, including the national government and local 
governments, help transition asylum seekers into the Italian workforce.329 Vocational 
training typically entails 30 hours per week of classes coupled with language 
instruction.330 In addition to access to the Italian labor market, asylum seekers have 
access to health care and education to the same extent as Italian citizens.331 Integration 
programs are also available within primary schools for newly arrived asylum seekers.332 
Finally, asylum seekers are also provided with legal assistance vis-a-vis their 
applications, but of the benefits provided, this is one of the hardest to actually obtain due 
to the diversity of the people applying for asylum and the limitations of the Italian 
government.333 On paper, Italy possesses a fairly robust support system for asylum 
seekers. The practice of such policy is rife with problems inherent in the system, the 
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nature and magnitude of the crisis, and external political forces that also have a stake in 
the outcome of the challenge. 
C. CHALLENGES TO THE ITALIAN ASYLUM SYSTEM 
The Italian asylum system faces several shortcomings, within and without. As 
was the case with much of Europe, Italy found itself ill-prepared for the massive influx of 
refugees from the Mediterranean and took measures that were both haphazard and ill-
considered in response. The largest challenge to the success of the Italian asylum system 
is the notion of the refugee hotspot, which was a measure pushed for by the European 
Union. The second challenge to the asylum system is the European Union’s Dublin 
Regulation, which makes asylum seekers stay in the country they initially file an asylum 
application with and also provides an impediment to a coherent European Union 
response. Third, problems intrinsic to the Italian system include the long lead time, the 
lack of enforcement rules concerning people denied asylum, and the proper access to 
social services. The fourth obstacle is the narrow legal acceptance and recognition of 
asylum seekers arriving on Italian shores. The fifth major problem is the inadequacy of 
the system to properly integrate new arrivals in Italy. All merit a deeper examination 
because they prevent effective economic integration of both refugees and migrants in 
Italy.  
The hotspot system was advocated by the European Union to control migration 
flows to Europe. Implementation began in September 2015, as a way to provide a few 
control points for entering migrants, as well as to serve as a corral for asylum seekers that 
would eventually relocate to various parts of the EU under a newly devised relocation 
program.334 Italy has six hotspots located throughout Sicily and southern Italy to 
facilitate processing of the arrivals of mixed migrants from the Mediterranean, with a 
“reception capacity for 93,000” that includes that aforementioned hotspots, as well as 
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Italian state facilities and accommodations.335 To date, the program has fallen fall short 
of its intended goal: as of June 2016, the EU has relocated a paltry number of only 143 
asylees (of the agreed upon 120,000) to other EU member states from Italy, while the rest 
(numbering in the tens of thousands) wait for a decision on their application process, 
relocation, and employment opportunities.336 Those channeled into the hotspots that do 
not have their asylum applications approved are either deported, or become 
“clandestini,” or undocumented immigrants in Italy.337 The EU and Italy are the subjects 
of much criticism for the implementation and management of the hotspots from multiple 
NGOs that assert that the system is mistreating vulnerable groups, including children and 
those with mental illness,338 and also serves to drive migrants to illicit activities, once 
they are denied asylum status.339 The hotspot system deported only 14,000 people from 
Italy over the course of 2015, which left untold thousands without asylum status in legal 
limbo, as many do not possess the means to voluntarily leave.340  
A second impediment to the economic integration of refugees within Italy is the 
Dublin III Regulation. The Dublin III Regulation is a European Union law that specifies 
the country responsible for examining an asylum application.341 The law mandates that 
an asylum seeker must file his or her request for asylum in the country in which he or she 
entered the European Union.342 This regulation swamps frontline nations, like Italy, 
within the EU by inhibiting the ability of such a state to pass an asylum application off to 
a less-burdened EU member state. In times of crisis and mass influx of refugees and other 
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migrants, the Dublin Regulation serves to bottleneck asylum seeker movement and thus 
places a long-term burden on the frontline state. Successful economic integration of 
refugees, or other migrants, is more onerous when the entire state system is 
overburdened. Realizing this, the EU has devised ad hoc fixes, such as the relocation 
program, in order to share the burden of the mass influx of refugees and other migrants. 
Existing policy, coupled with EU member state sovereignty and national refusals to 
accept refugees, has helped compound the problems of the frontline nation of Italy. 
While EU policy slows Italy’s ability to economically integrate refugees and 
migrants, the Italian state’s own policy serves as a major impediment to success in this 
regard. The lead time for asylum applications often reaches or exceeds 18 months, as the 
state lacks the resources to quickly sift through the diverse applicant appeals. Vocational 
programs for jobs are not standardized and programs vary by region.343 Although 
education is available and compulsory for everyone under 16 years of age, many asylees 
do not send their children to school and access can be limited depending on where 
asylees reside.344 Another factor here is that some schools may show reluctance to 
increasing their foreign-born enrollment.345 Asylee access to health care follows the 
familiar pattern of access to other social services. Access may be limited due to the 
remoteness of asylee residence or, when available, may lack the translation services 
necessary to convey asylee medical problems, or the expertise necessary to treat maladies 
unique to asylees.346 These shortcomings in services often lead an asylee to not go to the 
doctor until a condition has worsened, which constitutes a greater cost for the state in 
rendering medical care.347  
The problems outlined earlier affect people in the asylum process or approved for 
protection as a refugee; they do not begin to address the problems of the migrants who 
are rejected for asylum. Italy rejects nearly 50% of the migrants who apply for protection 
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under asylum conventions. Since expulsion is primarily voluntary, Italy only adds to the 
clandestini ranks without a viable solution for rejected asylum seekers. These economic 
migrants thus operate outside of the purview of the state and often engage in activity of 
the shadow economy of Italy, which is at best untaxed income the state forgoes and at 
worst, illegal and illicit activity. Rejected economic migrants will live in the shadows 
until one of three scenarios occurs: the Italian state provides them with amnesty, the state 
expels them forcibly, or the migrants move on to another state. As the crisis continues 
unabated, the number of rejected economic migrants will continue to rise. 
The final problem that Italy faces regarding the economic integration of refugees 
is its historically dismal record. Elena Cavena analyzed the platforms of the major 
political parties during the 2013 election in Italy, and found that almost none of them 
listed immigration in their platforms, and the ones that did (such as the right wing 
Northern League) associated it with crime and illicit activity.348 Nowhere in any political 
platforms was migrant or refugee integration discussed as an issue of importance. Anti-
immigrant political parties play a large role in Italian politics, particularly in Northern 
Italy.349 Italy’s problems with immigrant integration have caught the attention of 
international organizations. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) called Italy to task in 2014 by strongly suggesting that the country 
needed to do a better job of integrating its immigrant population. Specifically, the OECD 
stated that Italy needed 
A clearer and more efficient co-ordination of integration bodies . . . across 
local and sub-national levels. Cutting red tape, identifying and 
mainstreaming effective integration projects are needed. Language 
training provision is an example of a policy area lacking coordination, 
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with a [sic] myriad of different stakeholders funding and providing 
services with partial overlap.350  
The OECD leveled this criticism at Italy in July 2014, just as the migrant crisis was 
gaining significant attention in the Mediterranean.  
Italy thus faces several challenges concerning refugee and migrant integration and 
the crisis which brings them to the fore will continue for the indefinite future. The closing 
of the Balkan route and the EU-Turkey migrant deal will likely increase the number of 
people reaching Italian shores in 2016. The economic situation for much of Africa 
remains bleak with no substantive change in store in the near future. War continues to 
rage in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Without a massive improvement in 
political and economic conditions over large swaths of the world, Italy will continue to 
face the challenges of the refugee and migrant influx and must formulate flexible and 
long-term solutions to help it cope with the new status quo. 
D. THE REALITY OF AND POSSIBILITY FOR MORE ECONOMIC GAIN 
IN ITALY 
In the current refugee and migrant crisis, does a silver lining exist for the Italian 
state? It is clear from other cases that refugees can have a positive impact in their host 
countries when economic integration takes place. Does the same promise hold true for 
Italy? An examination of migrant impacts on Italy to date shows that, as with the cases 
noted earlier, Italy can benefit from the influx of refugees because it already benefits 
from in-country migrants. From a solution for Italy’s demographic problem to a 
perpetuation of the Italian welfare state, migrants are having a positive impact on Italy. A 
change of current policy would facilitate some alleviation of the current crisis and hold 
prospects of more economic gain for Italy. 
Italy faces a demographic problem on a fairly massive scale. As in many other 
European countries, Italian birth rates are low and its retirement population comprises an 
                                                 




ever-increasing portion of the population.351 Due to the tumultuous nature of most 
immigrants’ arrival methods to Italy, most refugees and migrants are under the age of 
65.352 This fact alone holds promise for Italy, because if economic integration occurred 
with new arrivals, it would hold the potential to expand the Italian tax base, which is a 
critical need as more of the Italian nation transitions to retirement age and leaves the 
workforce. Italy has a positive net immigration total, mostly spurred by the reunification 
of the families of migrants who settled in the country in previous years.353 The 
acceptance of more refugees would further add to the positive net gains for Italian 
immigration and would yield additional increases through family unification, since most 
of the refugees granted asylum in Italy are men. Expanding demographics is a major 
pillar for renewed Italian economic growth. 
Apart from the population potential that the acceptance of more refugees may 
hold for Italy, what impact have accepted migrants had on the Italian state so far? A 
recent report about the five million migrants residing in Italy shows that they are having a 
positive impact on the Italian economy. In contrast with a widely held belief in Italy, 
migrants do not lead to indigenous unemployment, and nearly 70% of the five million 
legal migrants in Italy are employed and paying taxes.354 Another popular assumption in 
Italy is that migrants pose a net negative cost for the government. However, the opposite 
is true. Immigrants in Italy in 2014 received some €3 billion in social services, but 
through taxes paid nearly €8 billion to social welfare programs.355 In practical terms, 
Roberto Garofoli, the Chief of Staff to the Italian Finance Minister, said that the net 
balance received in revenue from migrants was enough to pay for 600,000 pensions for 
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native Italians.356 The 2014 net gain from migrant tax revenue is over a threefold increase 
from the 2007 net gain of €1.4 billion.357 This trend shows that greater migrant 
settlement leads to greater net tax revenue for the state. Therefore, expanded programs 
for migrant and refugee settlement, while costly, can serve as a mechanism for 
investment in Italy’s future. Migrants and refugees in Italy can contribute to the same 
positive economic trends as presented in other migrant and refugee cases.  
To fully capitalize and realize the economic potential of the current crisis, Italy, 
along with the rest of the EU, must immediately address the shortfalls of the system. The 
EU must help Italy to shoulder the economic burden of crisis response. This would 
require billions of Euros to fully and adequately fund hotspot centers and provide the 
medical care necessary for the refugees. The EU must also come up with political 
agreements that work and would likely end, or at least reformulate, the Dublin III 
Regulation. Current plans for refugee relocation are failing in a rather dramatic fashion, 
due in large part to the failure of governments to conclude agreements with terms 
acceptable for all or most EU member states. Since many EU member states face the 
same demographic problems as Italy, a relocation program based on labor skills and 
talent might be more desirable than the current ineffectual quota system. This would 
require a collaborative effort across the EU, involving businesses, NGOs, and willing 
member states. A cohesive and long-term solution is ultimately what is needed for the EU 
to provide relief to Italy. 
Italy must contend with its own internal problems as well. Asylum approval is just 
over 50% for applicants. The majority of those rejected simply fall into the already robust 
shadow economy of Italy. Though many will migrate elsewhere, many will elect to stay 
in Italy. Rejected asylum seekers become illegal immigrants in Italy, and thus increase 
the number of clandestini. Mass deportation of rejected asylum seekers is highly unlikely 
and cost-prohibitive. It would therefore be advantageous for Italy to approach the 
problem with gain in mind. An expansion of asylum request acceptance would be a good 
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start to avoid driving people into the shadows. Establishment and funding of vocational 
programs across the country would allow Italy to redistribute asylees in a more effective 
and targeted manner; refugees could be sent to areas where their skill sets matched 
indigenous needs. Evidence suggests that relocation closer to or in urban areas leads to 
greater economic integration, so Italy’s focus should be to relocate refugees to populated 
areas. Relocation based upon vicinity to urban areas would allow asylees to get more 
targeted and specialized medical care if needed. The current crisis requires a structured, 
well-funded, but decentralized response all at the same time; and thus the state must work 
closely with NGOs, local governments, and the Catholic Church to effectively and 
economically integrate migrants and refugees around the country. 
Research shows that refugees can successfully integrate into a host nation’s 
economy and effective state policy can aid this process. Refugees historically are both 
producers and consumers of goods and can boost demand for host nation communities, as 
well as provide employment for the indigenous population. Migrants in Italy, whether 
they be political asylees or economic migrants, reflect trends of the positive impact of 
refugees in other states. As Italy continues to struggle with the crisis in the 
Mediterranean, it must balance the external pressures from the European Union and the 
internal pressures of domestic politics as the crisis continues. Streamlined and effective 
policy that focuses on long term solutions from the European Union, the Italian 
government, Italian municipalities, and NGOs can smooth the immediate negative 
impacts of the crisis and lay the foundation for economic renewal in Italy. The 
Mediterranean crisis can serve as an opportunity for gain for the Italian nation, migrants, 




The Mediterranean migrant crisis is but one portion of the greater migrant crisis 
occurring within and around Europe. The impacts of the crisis are profound and 
widespread, and as mass migration will continue for the foreseeable future, the full 
measure of the event will not likely be known for some time. By examining the impacts 
of the crisis on Italy, one can extrapolate data and trends that may apply to the European 
Union as a whole. To date, the Italian response to the migrant crisis has been valiant but 
simultaneously incoherent and disjointed. The effects of the crisis on Italy hold dire 
warnings for the rest of the European Union, but simultaneously present opportunity, 
provided that the current policy is revised to handle the crisis in a more effective manner. 
The Italian humanitarian efforts with Operation Mare Nostrum constituted an 
effective crisis-response mission at great cost to the Italian government. It is clear that 
without the mission and the heavy presence of the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean, 
which provided rescue-at-sea services to thousands of migrants, more deaths would have 
been the result of Italian Naval absence. Though the Italian Navy is credited with saving 
over 150,000 lives through the operation, it bore the majority of costs for the mission. 
Over the span of the 12-month operation, Italy received little, if any, material aid from 
the European Union and paltry EU financial aid for the mission costs. Only when the 
Italian government wound down the operation did it force greater European Union 
burden-sharing to the forefront. The EU has since taken over the humanitarian response 
efforts in the Mediterranean Sea under the auspices of Operation Sophia. The EU-funded 
and Italian-led operation continues to increase in both size and scope as the migrant crisis 
continues nearly unabated. Until the new Libyan government gains control over the 
national territory, provides security to its people, and is able to provide search-and-rescue 
operations for its maritime area of responsibility, the Mediterranean migrant crisis will 
likely continue for years. It is for these reasons, until the political and security situation 
stabilizes in Libya, that NATO naval forces should be brought in to aid the European 
Union’s Naval Forces in the Mediterranean, along with the expansion of refugee and 
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migrant flow control points throughout the Mediterranean region. The addition of NATO 
help will not stop the crisis, but it will provide more assets to control its effects.  
While there was never an opportune time to confront the largest migration crisis 
on the European continent since World War II, Italy was particularly ill-suited to 
adequately respond to the crisis with the instruments of economic power typically 
available to many nations of the European Union. Italy suffers from long term 
demographic problems, which put pressure on the welfare state. Italy’s demographic 
problems were further compounded by the global economic crisis of 2008, which led to 
the sovereign debt crisis shortly thereafter. Characterized by a debt-laden and stagnant 
economy, Italy is further restricted from deficit spending by the European Union. In the 
heavily debt-burdened nation, the spending constraints imposed by the European Union 
have made emergency spending for the migrant crisis response an issue of political 
contention. The migrant crisis has encouraged the Italian government to be more 
assertive in Brussels by historical comparison, and the migrant crisis will likely 
necessitate greater burden-sharing within the EU, both economically and militarily. Italy 
is a proponent of greater economic and military interdependence in the EU, and the crisis 
(at a minimum) will continue to stimulate dialogue about greater EU burden-sharing. 
Perhaps the most pressing trends that can be gleaned from examining the Italian 
response to the migrant crisis are the impacts that the crisis has had on Italian politics. 
Italian government institutions suffer from a legitimacy deficit vis-à-vis the Italian public. 
This deficit has led the Italian public to seek legitimacy through institutions outside 
Italy’s borders, namely through those provided by the European Union. Since the 
European Union was reticent to aid Italy in its initial responses to the migrant crisis, and 
has provided military and economic aid in a disjointed manner, Euroscepticism is on the 
rise in Italy. In addition to growing Euroscepticism, Italy has seen a rise in right-wing 
political parties, the strongest of which is the Northern League. Lega Nord has worked to 
capitalize on the inability of the Italian government and the European Union to stem and 
control the tide of migrants entering the country. A widespread and mostly accurate 
perception that the migrant crisis is out of control prevails in Italy, and this impression 
extends beyond Italian borders to other EU member states. Unless the government of 
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Matteo Renzi and the European Union can reverse the perception that they have lost 
control, right-wing parties will likely continue to gain in popular support in the absence 
of measurable progress to address the migrant crisis. 
While the effects of the migrant crisis on the Italian economy have had a large 
and costly impact, the crisis may present an opportunity for the Italian government. 
Various case studies have shown that refugees can have a positive economic impact on 
their host country if integrated properly. In order to take advantage of such economic 
prospects, Italy must work to revamp its immigration system. Asylum-seekers within 
Italy are denied at a nearly 50% rate, and without sufficient capabilities to deport those 
denied asylum, many stay in Italy and swell the numbers of the clandestini, or those who 
stay and work within the country outside of the official auspices of the Italian 
government. Italy must work to solve the problems in its immigration system and its 
interface with the EU via the Dublin III Regulation. Italy must also work to properly 
integrate the people to whom it grants asylum within the Italian economy by providing 
adequate language and vocational training. Working out a viable solution within the 
European Union for burden sharing of the challenges arising from the mass influx of 
refugees and migrants can hold a key to addressing the demographic decline in Italy and 
many other European Union member states. 
Ultimately, political and security stability in Libya holds the key to Italian relief 
regarding the migrant crisis. Until then, Italy must continue to seek solutions within the 
European Union to effectively respond to and manage the Mediterranean migrant crisis. 
Second only to Greece in the EU, Italy is in a precarious economic situation, but two 
silver linings are at hand. Greater burden sharing within the European Union, as well as 
proper economic integration of the refugees granted asylum, can provide immediate and 
long term relief for the beleaguered Italian economy. Some semblance of control of the 
migrant crisis, whether real or perceived by the Italian public, is necessary to stem the 
rising tide of right-wing nationalism in Italy. While the migrant crisis threatens the 
political stability of the Italian state, it could, if managed more adroitly, hold the key to a 
revitalized Italian economy which is more integrated within the European Union, both 
economically and militarily.  
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